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1. Introduction 
 
"It's a mystery why we chose Guyana out of all countries" 
Informant, Norwegian Government official 
 
 
Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) has won a highly 
prominent place in the Norwegian aid agenda, as well as in public debates about 
foreign aid priorities and climate change. It provides a real-world test case of the 
term “sustainable development”. Norway’s Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg first 
launched the initiative during the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) thirteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-13 in Bali 
in December 2007), when he announced that Norway would allocate up to three 
billion Norwegian Kroner (NOK) annually to work towards reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. 
A key feature of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
in Developing Countries (REDD) is to provide incentives and compensation to 
forest managers to reduce deforestation through payments for environmental 
services (PES) (Angelsen 2009:125).  
 
The dilemmas of achieving both environmental and social benefits are at the core 
of the concrete climate and forest initiatives, and REDD can thus be seen as one 
way of trying to achieve sustainable development. REDD is currently one of the 
most important initiatives in the global climate negotiations and has been one of 
few areas where it has been possible to align developing and developed 
countries. The fact that Norway has taken a lead role in the initiative investing up 
to 15 billion NOK by 2015 makes it almost imperative to study it closer.  
 
The REDD funding from Norway is channeled bilaterally or via multilateral 
funds. Norway’s bilateral REDD partner countries are large, forested countries 
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like Brazil and Indonesia.
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 These are ‘logical’ countries to choose as REDD 
partners in the sense that they are large forest-rich countries. 
 
But among the recipient countries is also another and quite different country. 
Guyana is small and little-heard-of both before and after it became a bilateral 
partner with Norway. It is an unusual recipient country in many ways. Norway 
has had no bilateral ties with Guyana before the REDD partnership. There is no 
Norwegian embassy in Guyana, and at the time of signing the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) in November 2010, the responsible Ambassador for the 
area was so-called “home-based,” meaning that he was working from Norway.2 
Norway has no apparent political or commercial interests in the country. Few 
Norwegians have even heard of the country, and even fewer would be able to 
place it on a map. Guyana is a small country, with only 770,000 inhabitants. It is 
located north of Brazil with its coastal stretch towards the Caribbean (see map on 
page xii). As with many poorer countries in South America, it is not poor enough 
to be labeled a developing country, but is considered a middle-income country. A 
risk report by Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) 
concluded that there are high risks associated with the partnership even after 
recommended measures are taken and that it represents a considerable negative 
reputational threat for Norway (Norad 2010). In spite of this, Guyana was chosen 
and is currently the country that has received the most bilateral REDD funding 
after Brazil, according to NICFI’s most recent update from October 2012.  
 
 
 
                                              
1 In addition to the bilateral partners, Norway also supports the multi-donor Congo Basin Forest Fund, 
the UN REDD Programme, as well as civil society in more than twenty different countries. 
2 In January 2011 the responsibility for Guyana was transferred to the embassy in Brasilia. 
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1.1 Research question 
 
As part of NICFI, Norway chose the small, South American country Guyana as a 
bilateral partner. The partnership is both surprising and groundbreaking, given 
that Norway has minimal knowledge about Guyana and no former official 
presence. This thesis therefore asks: why did Norway chose Guyana as partner 
country despite minimal experience and high levels of risks?  
 
To operationalize the question I will ask these sub-questions: 
 What international, domestic and governmental factors influenced Norway 
to go into REDD-partnership with Guyana? 
 Who were the key actors in the decision-making process and what roles 
did they play? 
 Were there different opinions regarding the partnership? 
 What was the level of influence exerted from the different actors or actor 
groups?  
To answer these questions I apply a Foreign Policy Analysis framework. This 
framework allows for identifying key actors meanwhile demonstrating how 
international, domestic and governmental factors play into the reasoning behind 
such a decision. 
1.2 Rationale for choice of topic and case 
NICFI over the last three years has been Norway’s largest aid initiative3 and 
carries with it many dilemmas concerning development and the environment. On 
the one hand it is a large-scale climate initiative, and on the other hand the 
money comes from the aid budget and must follow criteria for development aid. 
NICFI represents a very interesting case in within the thematic field of 
                                              
3 As I will develop further in my analysis, the fact that NICFI is funded by the aid budget is a 
controversial and contested issue. 
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development and the environment. Measuring the amount of payments based on 
results has been hailed as innovative and a model for a new way of giving aid. 
NICFI is also relevant, as it makes Norway the most important country on the 
donor side of REDD globally. The initiative itself thus is interesting to study for 
anyone interested in Norwegian aid policy and climate change mitigation. 
In my thesis I will, rather than analyzing the initiative as a whole, focus 
specifically on one country. I find that with the complex set-up of NICFI, it is 
fruitful to narrow the analysis to one country-specific case. This approach allows 
me to study the concrete decision-making process in greater detail. This analysis 
will, however, also include factors that also go for the initiative as a whole, as the 
explanations of the specific partnership with Guyana and explanations of the 
initiative as a whole will to some extent overlap. 
The reasons why I chose Guyana as my country case are perhaps less obvious. 
Guyana is little heard of in Norwegian public, but none the less it provides an 
interesting case study in relation to REDD. The main reason why I chose Guyana 
as case study is that I had worked with these issues at the Norwegian embassy in 
Brazil, and became aware of the diverging views about aid that this partnership 
revealed. I became interested in the case and wished to explore it. This is, in 
other words, a thesis that started from an interest in the case itself, and not from 
the purpose of testing a specific theory or model. 
Another and related reason was access. Access is essential: without it even the 
most interesting research question will be fruitless (Yin 2009:26). As I had 
already worked with Guyana while interning in the Norwegian embassy in 
Brazil, I knew which main actors would be important informants, and I had 
already established an overview of the case. Before deciding on Guyana, I had 
established that it would be possible to interview some key informants and that 
important documents could be retrieved from the electronic public records. This 
was important, because I was not allowed to make use of documents seen while 
working at the embassy without permission. Therefore I established that at least 
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some of the key documents could be retrieved for use in the thesis by request 
through the Norwegian official online archive.
4
  
Another feature is that Guyana is a small country, a fact that was also considered 
positively by the Norwegian decision-makers deciding on Guyana. For me, it 
meant that it would be possible to arrange interviews with a substantial number 
of the actors involved and get an overview in a relatively short time. For the 
climate and forest-secretariat (KOS)
5
 that meant that Norway could contribute 
substantially with less, and could actually have a national impact. The fact that 
little was known about this country which suddenly became a Norwegian aid 
recipient also provoked my curiosity. It is my opinion that I contribute with 
important understanding of an issue that has been absent from research on 
REDD, on a country which has received little attention in the Norwegian public. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
Having briefly presented my research question and the rationale for choice of 
topic and case, I will present the background of my case study in the next 
chapter. Here I will introduce REDD and Guyana to the reader, and provide the 
information needed to appreciate the analysis to come. The most important 
sources of inspiration to the REDD regime will be presented. Here I will also 
introduce the main actors analyzed more closely in chapter six. 
 
In chapter three I will present my theoretical approach, stemming from Foreign 
Policy Analysis (FPA), a theoretic branch within International Relations (IR). I 
will present key concepts and definitions and the three-part division adapted from 
                                              
4 All documents were obtained through oep.no. It is necessary to request approval in order to retrieve the 
various documents. Any documents that were denied access have not been used in the thesis. See chapter 
4.3 for an account of the main documents used. 
5 The use of NICFI and KOS may cause some confusion. NICFI is the term to describe the initiative 
itself, whereas KOS refers to the secretariat working with NICFI (see list of abbreviations on page x). 
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Hill (2003) that will structure my analysis: international, domestic and 
governmental factors. 
 
Chapter four contains my reflections on the methodology used. Here I will 
consider the case study approach and assess some of the challenges posed by the 
method in general, and in my case study specifically. I will also discuss issues 
regarding anonymous sources and possibility of generalization. 
 
Chapter five represents the interlude before the analysis. Here I explain what 
happened in the decision-making process and how the partnership is set up. Here 
I provide the reader with the knowledge needed to appreciate the analysis to 
come. 
 
Chapter six contains my analysis, divided into three sub-sections, the 
international, domestic, and governmental factors as developed in my theoretic 
chapter. In this part I discuss why Norway and Guyana became REDD partners. 
Through this section I demonstrate the usefulness of the actor-specific foreign 
policy analysis for my case study. Here I also point to how the partnership 
represents at the same time foreign aid, PES and foreign policy. 
 
Lastly in chapter seven I provide a short concluding chapter summarizing my 
main findings. Here I emphasize the findings which best answers my research 
question. 
 
The purpose of the thesis is not to evaluate the REDD project with Guyana as 
successful or unsuccessful. It is too early to reach a verdict on a project that is 
still in its opening phase. The purpose is rather to investigate factors that 
contributed to the decision made to choose Guyana despite arguments against it. 
My argument is that international, domestic, and governmental factors 
contributed, and that an actor-specific analysis must be provided to fully answer 
the research question. I found that the decision was a political one, to a large 
 7 
extent made by Minister Solheim himself and a few leaders of the initiative. The 
decision was characterized by lack of time, as the partnership was to serve as a 
model and had to be ready before the COP-15 meeting in Copenhagen in 
December 2009. In this context, development aspects and potential risks were 
given less emphasis. 
 8 
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2. Background 
In this chapter I lay the foundation for the analysis of the case study, and in doing 
so aim to provoke the reader’s curiosity. After reading this chapter, the reader 
will know key elements of REDD, REDD+, and Norway’s participation in the 
global REDD regime. This chapter will also familiarize with Guyana and the 
risks identified in partnering with the country.  
2.1 REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation 
The idea of REDD can be traced back to COP-11 in Montreal in 2005, when 
Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica put forward the proposal called “Reducing 
emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to simulative 
action” (Governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica 2005). In the 
proposal the two high-forested countries develop the argument for the REDD 
concept and for including deforestation in the UNFCCC framework.  
 
But it was not until Western actors joined in as REDD advocates that REDD 
fully materialized. In 2006 the British government commissioned the so-called 
Stern Review, which states that curbing deforestation can hinder the worst effects 
of climate change. The report was published in October 2006 and was widely 
noticed for its documentation of the seriousness of climate change. It provides a 
strong economic argument for paying for reduced deforestation, or for ‘standing 
forests’, as they have been known. The 4th IPCC Assessment Report was 
published in 2007 and further added to the momentum of REDD. It (re)affirmed 
the seriousness of climate change and established that deforestation contributed 
to almost a fifth of the world’s anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
(Nabuurs et al., 2007). These two reports in combination contributed heavily in 
convincing Norway to wager for REDD. 
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As a development initiative, REDD has gained attention for being performance-
based. International donors, funds or markets will, eventually, pay national or 
local agents based on results, after the results can be documented. The scale 
envisaged for REDD also distinguishes REDD from previous initiatives. REDD 
is, potentially, a deforestation and forest degradation initiative unprecedented in 
volume and scale (Angelsen 2009:294). 
2.2 REDD +: From trees to people 
In the last few years the name has changed from REDD to REDD +
6
. The + was 
added to count for all the issues in addition to avoided deforestation that should 
be included in REDD projects. According to the UN-REDD Programme 
“REDD+ goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks” (UN-REDD Programme 2009). The multiple benefits implied by 
this enhanced type of REDD include “ecosystem-based benefits” such as 
conservation of forest biodiversity, water regulation, soil conservation, timber, 
forest foods, and other non-timber forest products. REDD+ can also lead to direct 
social benefits, such as jobs, livelihoods, land tenure clarification, carbon 
payments, enhanced participation in decision-making and improved governance 
(UN-REDD Programme 2009).  
The REDD scheme has in other words a complex and wide-ranging set of goals. 
It pertains to not only trees and carbon, but also to the people, animals and 
organisms living in the forest. 
                                              
6 Throughout the thesis I use both REDD and REDD+. When speaking of the general mechanism I will 
use REDD for simplicity. 
 11 
2.3 Norway as REDD frontrunner 
Norway has taken a central role in REDD internationally. Stoltenberg’s statement 
in Bali 2007 and the large commitment gained attention, both within and outside 
of Norwegian borders. Norway is still by far the largest REDD donor. So far, one 
could argue that Norway is a frontrunner, but hardly a leader, as there are few 
followers in the field. This is the core argument of Frida Skjæraasen in her 
master thesis A frontrunner is not a leader (Skjæraasen 2011). Although 
Germany and the US have scaled up their funding, there is still not a large-scale 
mobilization of followers in place. 
 
Torbjørn Tumyr Nilsen (2010) in his master thesis discusses the motivation 
behind Norway’s large REDD initiative. According to him, NICFI becomes a 
way of greening the image of Norway, without making substantial changes 
domestically. Thus the nation can both be a major oil producer and save the 
climate at the same time (Nilsen 2010). The REDD set-up becomes a quick-fix 
following economic lines of reasoning that resonate well with Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg as an economist. 
 
Norway’s REDD funding comes from the aid budget, and it is reported as official 
development assistance (ODA). Whether REDD should be considered aid is the 
subject of political debate, which I will come back to throughout the thesis. 
Norway allocates REDD funding both through multilateral institutions and 
bilaterally. So far there are four countries that have bilateral agreements: 
Tanzania, Indonesia, Brazil, and Guyana. In addition, NICFI contains a civil 
society component, which is managed by NORAD. The civil society scheme 
supports national and international NGOs and other institutions that are 
considered relevant to enhance the REDD+ agenda (NICFI 2012:16). 
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2.4 The institutional set-up 
Following Stoltenberg’s announcement at Bali, NICFI was a reality. Discussions 
arose around where the initiative should be located. Both the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of the Environment (ME) claimed that they 
should be responsible for the initiative. The Minister responsible was Erik 
Solheim, who at the time had just become Norway’s first Minister for 
International Development and the Environment. During the Stoltenberg 
government I, Solheim was the Minister for International Development, and 
when the sitting parties were re-elected in 2007 under Stoltenberg II, Solheim 
became Minister for International Development and the Environment. This 
double-post was a historical exception; after Solheim left office in 2012, the two 
minister posts were again split. This means that during the discussions around the 
set-up of NICFI, Solheim was the Minister for the part of MFA dealing with 
development, as well as Minister for ME.  
 
As the initiative is to be financed from the aid budget, the MFA wanted the 
secretariat to be part of their Ministry as development aid is under MFA’s 
responsibility. On the other hand, NICFI is a climate initiative and thus also fits 
naturally under ME. After a process of discussions, the NICFI secretariat was 
finally set up in ME. The institutional set-up is not, however, straightforward. 
MFA still has the final responsibility on how the money is spent, as the REDD 
funding is taken from the aid budget. ME is responsible for the political aspects 
and decisions are mainly made there. But MFA and Norad are responsible for 
following the development aspects. Norad has the role of advisor and evaluator, 
while the final responsibility that the money does not go to corruption and that 
financial rules for ODA are kept, lies within MFA. 
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2.5 Guyana: a fly-over country 
Guyana, it is fair to say, is the least known and the least heard about among 
Norway’s REDD recipient countries. My informants in Norway call it a “fly-over 
country”, a country most people would never visit, only fly over at most. Before 
the REDD partnership, Guyana was mainly known for the horrible Jonestown 
massacre in 1977, when more than 900 people lost their lives in a collective 
suicide led by People’s Temple sect founder Jim Jones. But Guyana is also a 
country with large reserves of pristine rainforest and endemic species. 
 
Guyana is a small country with about 80 percent of its area covered with rain 
forest.
7
 The main source of deforestation is mining, which also leads to negative 
effects on the soil and surrounding rivers. But deforestation has not yet reached 
the speed and scale seen in most other forested areas of the world, which means 
that pristine rain forests are still intact. Therefore, high-coverage, low-
deforestation countries like Guyana are affectionately being called the “best 
pupils in class” by some of my informants in KOS. 
 
This small country north of Brazil is a complex one, with ethnic conflicts, high 
levels of corruption, and low levels of transparency. The population consists only 
of about 770,000 inhabitants. It is ethnically diverse and comprised of around 43 
percent of East Indian descent, 30 percent of African descent, and around 9 
percent classified as Indigenous groups called Amerindians. The remaining 18 
percent are of mixed descent. The party politics follows to a high degree the two 
largest ethnic groups, without any political party representing the Amerindian 
population (Norad evaluation department 2010). Historically, there has been an 
excellent education system in Guyana and high literacy rates compared to the 
region as a whole. However, political instability, paired with economic 
stagnation, has led to mass emigration among the skilled workforce. This has 
                                              
7 The vast amount of rainforest can be seen on the map on page xii 
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“led to extensive emigration of skilled people, creating a highly educated 
diaspora in the Caribbean, North America and UK particularly. Some people are 
now returning but the emigration of educated people has been a major loss to the 
country” (Norad evaluation department 2010). The percentage of this so-called 
brain-drain varies according to different estimates. One study by the International 
Monetary Fund conducted in 2005 found that 89 percent of university-educated 
Guyanese “eventually leave the country due to better employment options 
abroad; this represents the highest percentage of “brain drain” in the world” (US 
Department of State 2012). 
 
Guyana stands out among the partner countries, being the only one representing a 
country with historically low deforestation, with an annual average deforestation 
rate of only 0.022 percent over the last twenty years (Guyana Forestry 
Commission 2011). The baseline used to measure payments from Norway is set 
to count for the period 2000–2009, when deforestation amounted to 0.03 percent. 
In comparison, the global average deforestation rate is 0.52 percent. A reference 
level for Guyana is calculated as the mean value for these two measures, which 
amounts to 0.275 percent (Governments of Guyana and Norway 2011).  An 
amount of up to 250 million dollars is set aside to be spent within 2015 if Guyana 
keeps its obligations in the partnership. 
 
Guyana has prepared a Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS)
8
 and the 
support from Norway is meant to help the country pursue the low carbon 
development trajectory outlined in the strategy. The cooperation between Guyana 
and Norway is meant to, if successful, serve as a model for how developing 
countries, including countries that historically have had low deforestation, may 
receive financial compensation for preserving their forests (ME, 2011). 
 
                                              
8 The LCDS is further outlined in chapter 5.1.2. 
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Power in Guyana is centralized, with important decisions made in the Office of 
the President. Former president Bharrat Jagdeo
9
 has been active at the 
international arena in working for compensation for standing forests. He has been 
highly visible on the international arena in trying to incorporate forests in a post-
Kyoto agreement. In 2010 he won the UN Champion of the Earth prize, won by 
Minister Solheim the year before. 
 
2.6 Corruption and the risk assessment 
 
On Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2011, Guyana 
gets 2.5 points on a scale from 0 to 9, with 0 representing the highest level of 
corruption. That is down from 2.7 in the previous year (Transparency 
International 2011). The high level of corruption is a feature that Guyana shares 
with most tropical countries. In general it appears that when mapping the most 
corrupt countries and the most forested countries, the two overlap substantially. 
Highly forested countries tend to score low on governance indicators (Bofin et al. 
2011:5) 
 
On ME’s most recent update, Guyana is listed as the country that has received 
the most REDD funding after Brazil. The most recent update (October 2012) 
states that 396 million NOK, equaling about 70 million US dollars, have been 
transferred to Guyana (ME 2012).  However, the majority of this funding has not 
been disbursed by the World Bank, to the Guyanese government’s irritation, as 
explained in section 5.2. 
 
                                              
9 President Jagdeo’s presidential period ended November 2011, when he had been in office for two 
election periods, which is the maximum according to the Guyanese constitution. Donald Ramotar from 
the same party, People’s Progressive Party, won the 2011 election. He is not as intimately engaged with 
climate change as his predecessor. However, it is held among my informants that Jagdeo still to a large 
extent governs from behind the scenes. 
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Norad made a risk assessment of the country in 2010 where a number of risk 
areas are identified. A draft version was available in March 2010, and a final 
version was completed September the same year. The lack of governance 
transparency and deterioration of the freedom of the press is highlighted. It states 
a lack of capacity and resources and that there is poor political culture for 
involving consultations with local populations. A significant reputational risk for 
Norway as a donor country is also noted, and the overall residual risk is set to be 
high (Norad 2010).  
 
The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre in Norway was also consulted and 
gave an expert answer with overview of the corruption in the country, dated 
February 26, 2010. The U4 report, written by Marie Chêne, states that corruption 
is widespread, but that the available information is poor and that the report is 
therefore based on anecdotal evidence: “A comprehensive risk assessment of 
corruption risks would require more in-depth research and in-country data 
collection” (Chêne 2010). 
 
When Norad was asked to perform their risk assessment, they too based their 
report on available information without in-country data-collection. The 
knowledge on the risks was thus that the risks were probably high, but also that 
the level of contextual knowledge was low.  
 
Both the U4 expert answer and Norad risk report were issued after the MoU was 
signed. The MoU is a document stating the intention of collaboration without 
being a legally binding document, and was first signed November 2009. Even 
though it is not legally binding, it is politically binding in the sense that the 
countries are expected to follow up on the agreement. Thus, the MoU represents 
an important bench mark for the partnership. The risk assessment was made 
almost one year after, in September 2010. I will come back to the reasons behind 
this in chapter six. 
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2.7 Studying REDD in Norway 
Performing research on aid is not a favorite activity of researchers, according to 
Terje Tvedt (Tvedt 2003). Aid is a “moral activity”, and not something that most 
researchers would want to criticize; therefore, it tends to deter closer scrutiny. 
With his notion of “the south-political system,” Tvedt criticizes academia for not 
conducting enough research on foreign aid. According to Tvedt, aid has become 
a national trait defining Norway as a nation, but it has largely been neglected by 
the social sciences (Tvedt 2003:18). With this in mind, a closer look at aid 
decisions seems pertinent.  
 
Most ongoing research on REDD is somewhat policy-oriented. Arild Angelsen 
from UMB is editing one of the main REDD contributions, a series of CIFOR 
publications sponsored by NICFI. The Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) 
performs research on corruption in connection with REDD in their research 
series REDD Integrity. They in turn are sponsored by Norad.
10
 They focus on 
governance challenges in the weakest REDD recipient states. So far, they have 
conducted research on Uganda, the Philippines, and the Congo (CMI 2012). 
There have also been produced several real-time evaluation reports of NICFI’s 
contribution to national REDD processes in the partner countries. These 
examples do not constitute, however, basic, independent research. According to 
Kristin Rosendal, Norway spends a lot of money on REDD through consultants 
and NGOs. But when it comes to funding for independent research on REDD, 
funding is comparatively less abundant and available (Rosendal, personal 
communication 02.05.12).  
 
Perhaps as a result of that fact, research on the decision-making processes behind 
REDD has been largely absent. Studies that do look closer at what lie behind 
                                              
10 Terje Tvedt has written on state-funded development research and what he calls Norwegian national 
corporatism (Tvedt 2009). 
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NICFI are typically master theses. One example is before-mentioned Torbjørn 
Tymur Nilsen (University of Oslo (UiO), Centre for Development and the 
Environment) using post-development theory to analyze the paradoxes behind 
the Norwegian climate and forest initiative (Nilsen 2010, mentioned in chapter 
2.3) and Irene Øvstebø Tvedten (UiO, Centre for Technology, Innovation and 
Culture) on the apolitical nature of official discussions around REDD (Tvedten 
2011). 
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3. Theoretical framework  
The social science that we want to concern ourselves with is a science 
of actuality. We want to understand in its particularity the 
encompassing actuality of the life in which we are placed – on one 
hand, the coherence and cultural significance of individual 
occurrences in their contemporary configuration, and on the other 
hand, the reasons for those occurrences being historically so and not 
otherwise (Max Weber quoted in Neumann  2012).  
 
My main framework for analysis is based on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a 
theoretical approach within IR. I found this framework to be appealing to analyze 
my empirical material. FPA came as a reaction to the assumption of the rational, 
unitary actor with pre-given goals, usually power maximization (Hill 2003:8). It 
allows the researcher to explore who are the key decision makers and what ideas 
frame their understanding of the situation. It does not take the interests for 
granted, but opens up for a more thorough and decision-near analysis. FPA 
therefore fits well with the findings in my case: namely, the varying ideas about 
REDD and Guyana apparent in different parts of the government and 
bureaucracy.  
 
FPA, furthermore, is an exploratory framework that takes the empirical case 
seriously and gives room to look at the case with an open mind. Thus, it 
resonates with one of the very ideas behind multi-disciplinarity: namely, that one 
should not be so constrained by theory as to be blind to the specifics of the case 
at hand. 
 
First I will pay attention to the fact that I use FPA on an unusual field: namely, a 
foreign aid allocation. Then I will outline the characteristics of FPA as a theoretic 
branch and how it is different from mainstream IR theory. I will then give a brief 
overview of one of the founding fathers of FPA, before I proceed to the three 
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dimensions that will structure my analysis. These are international, domestic, and 
governmental politics. 
3.1 Foreign aid policy analysis: uniting values and 
interests 
FPA has commonly been utilized for studying security issues and typically the 
decision of going (or not going) to war (Hill 2003; Mintz and DeRouen 2010; 
Smith et al. 2008). Whereas most FPA analyses focus on high politics decisions, 
this thesis’s focus is an aid allocation, usually conceptualized as low politics. 
Decisions within foreign aid are rare topics within FPA analysis for a number of 
reasons. One reason is that foreign aid is a small sub-field at the periphery of IR. 
Furthermore, as Tvedt convincingly argues, foreign aid is not a favorite topic 
amongst academics and researchers (Tvedt 2003). Tvedt points to “an unfruitful, 
but influential” conceptual separation between foreign policy guided by self-
interest and development policy as guided by values and altruism (Tvedt 
2007:619).  
However, foreign aid is part of Norway’s foreign policy, and it is a stated 
national goal to bring the developmental policy and foreign policy closer together 
as a whole. This is highlighted in the White Paper 15 Interests, Responsibilities 
and opportunities, The main features of Norwegian foreign policy. The report 
highlights how altruistic interests and Norwegian national interests are not 
mutually exclusive, but that they rather can overlap. This foreign policy that 
embodies both altruism and national interest is named “policy of engagement,” 
which “is first and foremost motivated by altruism (…) On the other hand, the 
broad globalization processes and geopolitical changes we are seeing today are 
giving the policy of engagement new significance as it promotes the realization 
of objectives that are also in Norway’s interests” (MFA 2009b:112).  
The Norwegian international climate policy, and NICFI as part of it, is one 
example of such policy of engagement. This case study is one good example of 
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aid allocations that aim to achieve a political goal. There are no clear lines 
between foreign policy and foreign aid. In the White Paper Climate, Conflict and 
Capital —Norwegian development policy adapting to change, climate change is 
mentioned as an issue that represents both a common good, and thus is in 
Norway’s interest to preserve, as well as in the poor countries’ interest (MFA 
2009a:10). 
Aid decisions are part and integral to foreign policy and, I will argue, should be 
studied as such. The same actor-near framework provides a fruitful approach to 
foreign aid allocation decisions, just as it did to Graham Allison’s missile crisis 
in Cuba (Allison 1969), a FPA pioneer study, which will be outlined in chapter 
3.3. It is my argument that using the FPA framework on an aid allocation 
contributes to important insights and understandings of the dynamics at stake. 
 
3.2 Room for agency 
Perhaps the most important asset for my study, has been FPA’s actor-specific. In 
the first edition of the journal Foreign Policy Analysis, Valerie Hudson (2005) 
gives an overview of what characterizes FPA, both historically and 
contemporarily. FPA is seen against mainstream IR theory with its favoring of 
grand theories. FPA on the other hand, takes context, human agency and power 
into the theoretic and analytic approach. Her overview gives examples of 
empirical research done using the FPA framework up to 2005. She traces FPA 
back to the late 1950s, when several paradigmatic works were published. Works 
like Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics 
(Snyder et al. 1954) “inspired researchers to look below the nation-state level of 
analysis to the players involved” (Hudson 2005:6, emphasis in original). In FPA, 
“states are not agents because states are abstractions and thus have no agency” 
(Hudson 2005:2). Thus, FPA will analyze the actions of specific individuals, and 
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not the state, which is discarded as a “metaphysical abstraction” (Snyder et al. in 
Hudson 2005:6).  
 
After the end of the Cold War in 1991 there was a renewed interest in actor-
specific theory. The end of the Cold War showed that it is not possible to predict 
system-change at the level of system-level variables alone. More factors had to 
be taken into account, such as the personalities of the key actors and the internal 
struggles between various domestic players (Hudson 2005:14). In other words, 
the need for an actor-specific analysis gained renewed momentum. But FPA is 
not only suited to describe large-scale system change; it is also, I suggest, a 
fruitful approach to studying change in aid priorities and an allocation to a new 
and unfamiliar country. 
 
3.3 Allison: an integrative analysis 
Graham Allison, in his famous article on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 
1969), provides an early example of the benefits of an integrated analysis beyond 
the standard rational model, which supposes a rational, unitary state. He outlines 
three models of analysis, which are supplementary and give an integrated 
analysis when combined. Although I do not intend to follow his three models, I 
will outline them briefly, as the insights provided by them were important to the 
field of FPA and has influenced its development. The most important insight is 
perhaps the appreciation of an integrationist theoretical perspective, and the 
observation that the conceptual lens used will determine the answer to a research 
question (Carlsnaes 2008:90). 
 
The first of Allison’s models is the “Rational Policy Model,” which tries to 
identify the “objective” interests of the state. Traditionally, most analysts have 
explained behavior of national governments in terms of this model (Allison, 
1969). But as Allison shows, a model that supposes a unified national 
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government may not be well suited to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis, or as I 
shall argue, the Guyana-Norway agreement. It will only be a partial explanation.  
 
Allison suggests a Model II: “Organizational Behavior,” where he focuses on the 
politics inside the government. Here the observed outcome or the foreign policy 
decision is seen as an output of the Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) of 
the organization from which the decision emerged. Pre-existing routines and 
behavior explain why a state acted a certain way.  
 
Model III “Bureaucratic Politics” considers the actors themselves as important 
agents, and is very relevant to my case. Here, governmental choices can be seen 
“as outcomes of bargaining games” among many different players in the national 
government. Their goal is not to be analyzed as a unitary, strategic issue, but 
rather “various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals” that 
pull and haul against each other in what eventually becomes the state’s foreign 
policy (Allison, 1969:707). In an analysis, the perceptions, motivations, 
positions, power, and maneuvers of principal players are important: “What 
moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons which support a course of 
action, nor the routines of organizations which enact an alternative, but the power 
and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question” (Allison 
1969:707). The model asks some core questions: “Who plays? Whose views and 
values count in shaping the choice and action?” Within this model the researcher 
also tries to establish “what factors shape each player’s (a) perceptions (b) 
preferred course of action; and thus (c) the player’s stand on the issue” (Allison 
2008:227). 
Allison’s article has become highly influential, but has also met criticism. Bendor 
and Hammond (1992 in Mintz and De Rouen 2010:74) conclude that the rational 
actor model is poorly specified and set up as a straw man. Basing the two next 
models on a model that is set up to fail magnifies the problem (Mintz and 
DeRouen 2010:75). 
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Allison’s models have, however, developed over the years, both by various 
theoreticians of IR and not least by Allison himself (see, for example, Allison 
2008). The last two models of organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics 
soon merged into a single model called “Governmental Politics” 11 (Hill 
2003:85). Being aware that Allison’s Model I is overly superficial, I still make 
use of insights provided by Allison’s article when analyzing the thesis. I will 
make special use of his insights from Model II and III, which I think Allison 
convincingly describes as important factors in foreign policy decision-making, 
and a fruitful addition to any study of foreign policy decision-making. I will 
develop my use of Allison in chapter 3.4.3 “Governmental politics.” But let me 
first turn to a more recent FPA theorist that has informed the larger structure of 
my analysis. 
3.4 Hill: Three sources of foreign policy 
Christopher Hill, like Allison, operates with a three-fold division when analyzing 
what influences foreign policy. Hill’s book is divided into three parts entitled 
“Agency”, “The International” and “Responsibility”. Under these headlines, Hill 
discusses governmental politics, the international system and domestic factors 
that will influence foreign policy. Hill incorporates Allison’s Model II and Model 
III in his account for Agency and in addition he distinguishes between the 
international and domestic level. Therefore I find Hill’s three-folded set-up more 
appropriate for my case study. The fact that the international level is given more 
specific attention in Hill (2003) than in Allison (1969) might simply be due to the 
importance attached to globalization in recent years. At the time of writing 
“Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Allison 1969), the 
international level was perhaps seen as relatively less significant in an analysis of 
                                              
11 The use of the term “Governmental politics” might cause some confusion, as it has been used both as a 
term for Model III and to describe Model II and Model III combined. Allison himself changes the name 
of  Model III from “Bureaucratic Politics” in his earliest articles to “Governmental politics” in later 
versions (See Allison 1969 and Allison 2008). My use of the term “Governmental politics” brings with it 
elements from both Model II and Model III. 
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a country’s foreign policy. Today, in the context of globalization and increased 
interconnectedness,
12
 I find it pertinent to examine how factors at the 
international level influence foreign policy decision-making. I find that Hill 
provides a fruitful analytical structure for the study of my case. I will thus adopt 
Hill’s three-fold division, but rename them international, domestic, and 
governmental politics and will discuss them in that order, both here and in the 
analysis in chapter six. 
 
The three components, international, domestic, and governmental politics, are 
intertwined and affected by each other, but I find them to provide a logical 
analytical division, well-suited to perform a holistic FPA analysis. The structure 
is commonly used for analyzing foreign policy decision-making (Carlsnaes 
2008:88). This three-level approach also incorporates the actor-structure divide. 
Such three-fold types of analysis will in general focus more on structures at the 
international level and gradually move to a focus on actors when analyzing the 
bureaucratic (Carlsnaes 2008:89). This continuum of structures to actors is 
visualized in figure 2:  
 
     1) International politics                       Structures 
     2) Domestic politics 
     3) Governmental politics                       Actors    
Figure 2 Levels of analysis 
In my analysis we will, however, also see that it is not only structures that 
dominate at the international level. Actors can be important also at the 
international arena, connected through government networks (Slaughter 2001 and 
                                              
12 A discussion of the effects of globalization and if the world in fact is becoming more or less connected 
is not a subject for this thesis. 
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2004) or epistemic communities (Haas 1992). As I opt for a three-fold analysis, 
my aim is an integrated analysis that manages to point to the links between the 
three levels. It is this integration that is the main challenge, the theoretical 
integration of the three levels still being “a potential that remains unfulfilled for 
the time being” (Hudson cited in Carlsnaes 2008:89). In the following I will 
examine these three components at some length, as they will structure my 
analysis in chapter five. 
3.4.1 International politics; norms and networks 
“What then, from the viewpoint of the actors (and our understanding of them, 
which is not the same thing) is the ‘international’ like? What are the predominant 
features of their external environment?” (Hill 2003:164). Hill’s own answer to 
the question I find a bit too vague to provide fruitful concepts for an analysis. 
Hill emphasizes the changing nature of “the international” and notes how actors 
are embedded in structures that they both help constitute and are shaped by (Hill 
2003:166). Hill’s conceptualization of the international consists of, on the one 
hand, a system with “various different levels, mysteriously but definitely 
interconnected” (Hill 2003:164). This is not a very operational definition. A 
system with mysteriously connected levels is perhaps a good description of the 
international reality but is far from helpful in an analysis that needs some clear-
cut concepts. Hill’s conceptualization of globalization is that of an “even less 
systematic notion” (Hill 2003). Therefore, as I make use of his three-parted 
division, I will look to other theoreticians for a conceptualization of the 
International.  
 
My conceptualization of the international political level is influenced by 
constructivist stances of FPA. Here, the state’s identity shapes its interests and 
both the identity and interest are influenced by international society (Barnett 
2008:194). For example, commitment to human rights and the spread of 
democracy will shape a state, and not just concern for security and wealth 
(Barnett 2008:194). Importantly, following the constructivist foreign policy 
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analysts, states care about what other states in the international society think 
about them. They want their foreign policy to seem legitimate according to 
prevailing norms. In this view, states are respected for their ability to defend 
universal principles, and not their ability to aggressively defend their interests in 
a Hobbesian world society (Barnett 2008:194). In this line of reasoning, 
responsible climate aid might also provide a nation with respect and legitimacy.  
 
According to Barnett, while realists focus mainly on communities within the state 
constructivists suggest “a transnational community that encourages states and 
their societies to be concerned about the welfare of others.” Such communities 
may be global or regional (Barnett 2008:194) and may be likened to networks. 
Anne Marie Slaughter conceptualizes the locus of interaction at the international 
arena with her concept of Government networks. Launched in her 2004 book A 
New World Order, the concept unveils a new understanding of how states 
interact. Instead of looking at a system of states that makes decisions in a rather 
independent manner, the new world order is marked by webs or networks of 
government officials, organizations, and multilateral organizations that meet 
regularly at international conferences. It is within this network that one must look 
to understand modern and future decision-making, according to Slaughter. She 
sees the people within these networks as the key actors in foreign policy 
(Slaughter 2004).  
 
The notion of government networks is similar to the concept of “Epistemic 
communities” as defined by Peter Haas. His definition is networks “of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain or 
issue-area.” These may not come from different disciplines but share the same 
normative and principled beliefs and the same perception of causal mechanism, 
as well as prescription of proper action (Haas 1992:3). As we will see in my 
analysis (section 6.1.2) it is possible to detect an epistemic community based on 
an economic logic in this case. 
 
 28 
According to Haas, a growing number of decisions are characterized by 
uncertainty. That is, actors must make choices without “adequate information 
about the situation at hand” or in the face of “inadequacy of the available general 
knowledge needed for assessing the expected outcomes of the different courses 
of action”13 (Alexander George cited in Haas 1992:14). Under these 
circumstances, decision makers will typically make use of epistemic 
communities as advisors. The epistemic communities can be consulted as a 
justification for choosing policies already decided upon for political reasons, or 
they can exert real influence both on defining the possible alternatives and on the 
chosen course of action (Haas 1992:15-16). 
 
3.4.2 Domestic politics: the four P’s 
I find Hill’s analysis of domestic politics to be more concise than his 
International level and I will make more use of him in this section. The 
relationship between domestic policy and foreign policy has two dimensions, 
according to Hill. First, foreign policy is vulnerable to domestic events. Second, 
foreign policy affects domestic politics (Hill 2003:219). As my research question 
deals with the influences on a foreign policy decision, and not vice versa, I here 
focus on the first dimension. It is difficult to generalize exactly how domestic 
factors influence foreign policy, and those who put too much weight on domestic 
explanations run the risk of one-dimensional analysis. Hill argues that the 
domestic and the international both interact, like in Putnam’s notion of the two-
level game. Domestic environment shapes foreign policy, in interaction with 
international factors, or in Hill’s words: “foreign policy is about mediating the 
two-way flow between internal and external dynamics” (Hill 2003:21). It can be 
fruitful to imagine foreign policy makers as “Janus-faced” where two different 
sets of concerns with different logics constantly interact (Hill 2003:221). 
                                              
13 See the last section of chapter 3.4.3 for an account of what can characterize Foreign Policy Decision 
Environments. 
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Domestic sources both influence and put constraints on foreign policy. 
Importantly, the domestic environment is far from monochrome; rather it consists 
of different actors and kinds of activity (Hill 2003:223). Hill conceptualizes the 
main actors as the four Ps: parliaments, public opinion, pressure groups, and the 
press. A 2004 publication entitled Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid: A 
comparative analysis of the United States, The United Kingdom, Canada, France 
and Japan (Van Belle et al. 2004) thoroughly analyze the effect of one of Hill’s 
Ps: the press -and other types of media. They look specifically at how press 
coverage influence both public opinion and foreign aid allocations and establish 
through six extensive case studies that media indeed is an important factor when 
analyzing a country’s foreign aid policies.  
 
In addition, social classes and regime type are also domestic factors that 
influence foreign policy and provide categories for empirical assessments (Hill 
2003:223). An examination of different classes’ possible influence on this 
specific policy decision is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, I will limit 
myself to Hill’s four P’s for an understanding of domestic society’s influence on 
foreign policy.  
 
3.4.3 Governmental politics: the actors at centre stage  
Foreign policy analysts question the notion that “states want” or “states act.” 
They see it indispensable to break the actor down to its various levels and 
components (Hudson 2005). This section builds on Allison’s Model II and Model 
III and makes the actor-near framework of FPA apparent. It looks closer at the 
organizations and key actors involved in the decision-making. Who were the key 
actors and what were the positions in the various ministries involved? Was the 
decision a result of consensus-building or leadership? (Hill 2003:52). In short, 
who governs? 
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Who governs in foreign policy? 
In foreign policy, as opposed to other policy fields, important decisions may be 
derived without catching the attention of the public eye, as foreign policy issues 
are not always at the center of popular concerns. Whereas health, education and 
transport will never go by unseen or uncommented, that might be the case for 
some parts of foreign policy (Hill 2003:70). Who is it that has the opportunity to 
handle foreign policy decisions? 
 
According to Hill, the head of state must be included in an analysis of foreign 
policy, as in most political systems policy will be conducted by the head of 
government together with the departmental Minister, which in this case means 
the Minister for International Development and the Environment. In addition 
there is the group of trusted colleagues who are gathered in the inner circle (Hill 
2003:58). These decision makers have the opportunity to dispose a great deal of 
influence. As external policy requires relatively little legislation, the decision 
makers have a fairly unstructured decisional environment to exploit. This puts a 
large responsibility on the relatively small group that handles foreign policy, 
according to Hill. The formal, political decision-makers have the opportuity to 
exert leadership and have significant scope to influence events and to personify 
the state in their actions (Hill 2003:56). 
 
Bureaucrats and Politicians 
The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is an interesting one in any 
foreign policy analysis. Hill suggests that the tail (the bureaucracy) cannot easily 
be separated from the dog (the politicians). The fact that the term “official” 
covers both politicians and bureaucrats is telling in this regard. It implies that it 
would be naïve to look at bureaucrats as being apolitical (Hill 2003:95).  
 
In theorizing bureaucracy, a continuum can be made between theories of loyal 
agents that do what they are told by the democratically elected to theories of 
actors that in fact are the real sources that decide foreign policy (Hill 2003:72). 
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The first refers to Max Weber’s ideal type and what was the model for most 
European states in the second half of the twentieth century. Here bureaucrats are 
seen as agents who do what they are told by their Minister, not actors in their 
own right. At the other end of the continuum are theories of bureaucratic politics. 
Within this body of theorizing, bureaucratic units pursue their own versions of 
the national interest. Policy is the result of an internal process of bargaining and 
maneuvering, and not some clear, rational decision at the state-level. This 
approach has its roots in Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model, described in 
chapter 3.3.  
 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model has been criticized for putting too much weight 
on the bureaucratic actors, but without making clear how these actors are 
socialized into certain ways of perceiving the world (Hollis and Smith 1986:270). 
The notion of roles and role-socialization might be useful in this regard. The idea 
is that the organization socializes its staff to certain attitudes and values. Martin 
Hollis and Steve Smith in their 1986 article amend the notion of roles to 
adequately deal with agency. The concept of role becomes the missing link 
between structure and actors as it gives leeway for human agency within the 
bureaucratic structure. Hollis and Smith show how different personalities 
interpret different roles and how roles can also be conflicting (Hollis and Smith 
1986:276).  
 
According to Hill, bureaucracies tend to be risk-averse, systematic, and 
conservative. Hill notes how the most common stereotype of bureaucracies as the 
manifestation of pettiness is not without roots in reality (Hill 2003:94). The most 
common practice of bureaucracy, one would therefore assume, is not that of 
innovative, new financial mechanisms or of taking risks.  
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Definition of the situation and decision environment 
The governmental politics model also asks how the key actors perceive the 
situation and thus how they view the preferred course of action (Allison 
2008:227). The concept of key actors’ “definition of the situation” can be traced 
to the 1954 publication Foreign Policy Decision-making by Snyder, Bruck, and 
Sapin. It also underlies Allison’s Model III. A country’s interests are constituted 
by ideas; they are not objectively given. It is important to uncover how central 
decision-makers define the situation in order to understand and analyze foreign 
policy. Thus, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin attempt to re-create “the world of the 
decision makers as they view it. The manner in which they define situations 
becomes another way of saying how the state is oriented to certain actions and 
why” (Snyder cited in Houghton 2007:31).  
 
During the decision-making process these actors will be influenced by a number 
of factors that comprise the “decision environment” (Mintz and DeRouen 
2010:25). These factors are: 
 
Time constraints: Time constraints do not necessarily lead to bad decisions. 
Sometimes time constraints can force the decision maker to devote full attention 
to a problem. Time constraints do, however, often lead to non-holistic search and 
so-called “satisficing” decision-making, meaning choosing the first alternative 
that satisfies some criteria, and not the best out of all alternatives.  
Information constraints: Incomplete and inaccurate information is more the rule 
than the exception in foreign policy. Incomplete information may be caused by 
biased providers of information “in the field” and leads to sub-optimal conditions 
for decision-making. 
Ambiguity: When information has multiple and competing meanings, ambiguity 
occurs. Ambiguous information is more likely to be ignored or discounted. 
Ambiguity typically will increase complexity thus causing leaders to use 
cognitive shortcuts to simplify the decision-making process. 
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Familiarity: When a situation is similar to a previous situation, decision makers 
often intuitively go for what has worked before. This may help the decision 
process, but may lead to the discounting of important information. 
Accountability: When one is held accountable for a decision, one will usually be 
more careful, and procure and evaluate information in a more holistic manner. 
These tendencies are increased when the leader commits publicly to a course of 
action. 
Risk: The amount of risk one is willing to take is affected by how satisfied one is 
with status quo. Also, individual attitudes will affect risk willingness. 
Stress: Defined as an excess of demands over capacity. Low levels of stress can 
have positive effects, whereas stress is most often associated with negative 
effects on decision-making.   
Dynamic vs. static setting: In static settings the decision maker will be aware of 
all alternatives upfront and these alternatives remain fixed during the decision 
process. In a dynamic setting, alternatives or criteria changes during the process.  
Interactive setting: The decision makers will be affected by the decisions made 
by other actors, both previous and future. 
According to Mintz and deRouen all these factors are common traits that to 
varying degrees define the decision environment for foreign policy decision 
makers. As we will see in the analysis, most of these factors seem to apply for 
the Guyana case. 
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3.5 Challenges related to the FPA framework 
I decided on FPA as my framework because I find that overall it allows for a 
fruitful analysis of the case at hand. It allows the researcher to analyze the actors 
and bureaucratic entities involved, which is enlightening in this case. But there 
are some challenges to FPA, which have also been challenges for this thesis. 
First, the field of foreign policy is influenced by a wide array of factors ranging 
from individual traits, via domestic processes to international structures. As 
James Rosenau put it “little of human behavior falls outside the scope of the 
analysis of foreign policy phenomena” (Rosenau 2008:vii, my italics). Foreign 
policy phenomena are inordinately complex, and these complexities cannot be 
assumed away as they are so central to the dynamics of foreign policy. Therefore, 
one has to select some of the complex phenomena that seem especially relevant 
and examine these in relation to each other as interactive (Rosenau 2008:vii).  
The task of reconstructing a decision-making process is also a challenge in itself. 
It requires data gathering from different sources, often sources that are not easily 
accessible. As FPA is an actor-specific framework, the analysis ideally includes 
in-depth interviews with all the main actors involved to really uncover their 
‘definition of the situation’. A thorough FPA research could thus easily become 
impossible to conduct within the scope of a Master’s thesis. One objection to 
FPA is that it “requires a ‘back-breaking burden’ of near impossible proportions 
to be assumed by the analyst” (McClosky cited in Hudson 2005:3). However, my 
aim is not to provide an in-depth psychological account of the actors involved, as 
the cognitive strands of foreign policy decision-making approaches tend to aspire 
to do. Uncovering possible “ulterior motives” is if anything a task for 
psychologists, and is not among my ambitions for this Master’s thesis. I will 
rather perform an integrated analysis of the international, domestic, and 
governmental factors that contributed to the decision. 
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4. Methodological approach 
In this section I outline the methods used to collect the data for this qualitative 
case study. I have relied most heavily on interviews and document analysis and I 
present both my informants and type of documents in the following pages. Lastly 
I discuss the principles of validity and generalization in connection with this case 
study. 
4.1 An interdisciplinary master’s thesis 
Coming from the interdisciplinary master’s program Culture, Environment and 
Sustainability, what guidelines does this background give in writing this thesis? 
The intuitive answer could perhaps be: few guidelines, as there are few clear-cut 
dos and don’ts. One can base one’s evidence both on quantitative and qualitative 
data. One can perform fieldwork, or one can write a purely philosophical thesis.  
 
Nevertheless, the program does emphasize some approaches over others. It 
encourages an inductive approach when doing field work and warns about the 
danger of letting theoretical concepts steer the analysis too much. For example, a 
strictly rational-choice analysis would have great difficulties in capturing 
important aspects of the case in this thesis. In an interdisciplinary study, one is 
not constrained by such traditional and discipline-specific lenses and may be 
better prepared to let theoretical tools fit the case, instead of trying to make the 
case fit the theory. Thus, as proponents of interdisciplinarity would argue, one is 
better equipped to see and analyze the multi-faceted and complex reality of how 
society and the environment interact. The program has also clearly affirmed that 
interdisciplinary is not to be equated with a lack of rigor. In fact, I would argue 
that one must be perhaps even more rigorous departing from an “inter-discipline” 
rather than a specific discipline. Precisely because the guidelines are more open, 
one must be all the more conscious, precise, and explicit about what one is doing 
and why.  
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In this thesis I have aimed at exploring my case in detail, and using my 
theoretical framework to understand the case. In this way, my aim is not to 
develop a theory, but rather use the theoretic aspects which I find helps 
illuminate the case at hand. It is thus an explorative, rather than theory-testing 
case study. 
4.2 Ontological stance 
In the social sciences ontology, one can outline a continuum where the positivist 
and the constructivist mark the extreme points of the scale. The purely positivist 
would aim for science to state clear facts about the world. The radical 
constructivist would argue that one can only find out about representations about 
the world. The world is socially constructed, and it is through context that this 
world becomes meaningful (Moses and Knutsen 2007). In this spectrum, the 
preferred methods would also follow the same line of continuum. Thus, the 
positivist would prefer the experiment as their method, whereas the constructivist 
would employ a broad spectrum of methods in which the context becomes key to 
the understanding. The context, which ideally is eliminated in the natural science 
experiment, is thus at the center when the constructivist performs her research.  
Within this continuum I would place myself as a researcher somewhere in the 
middle. I believe that one can find facts about aspects of the world through 
science, and I believe that there are various complementary methods to doing so. 
In this thesis I have aimed to shed light on aspects of political processes, and not 
only perceptions. However, in my analysis I also show how the perceptions of 
reality differ among actors and stakeholders and that this difference in perception 
matters in decision-making.  
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4.2.1 Flexible design, flexible researcher 
Robson (2011) divides research into fixed and flexible, instead of the more 
common distinction between qualitative and quantitative. This study pertains to 
the flexible research design. Such a design demands of the researcher that she be 
dynamic and open to changes during the course of the research. The design will 
typically emerge and develop during the data collection (Robson 2011:131).  
 
It involves the researcher-as-instrument, and the quality of the study depends to a 
large degree on the quality of the investigator. Personal qualities like an open and 
enquiring mind, being able to grasp both theoretical and policy issues and the 
ability to balance adaptiveness and rigor are some of the qualities needed 
(Robson 2011:134). One has to be a good and attentive listener with a well-
functioning memory. I found that using a recorder and listening through the 
interviews helped me develop some of these skills. On the one hand, listening to 
the interviews made me realize what types of questions worked and which did 
not. Transcribing and the close listening which transcribing demands also helped 
me grasp analytically the levels of information which were less obvious and 
which I had not grasped at first. 
 
Inherent in the flexible design, is recognizing that the enquiry has a progressive 
nature, much like solving a puzzle. The investigator is learning and getting ideas 
underway and must be able to change perceptions and angles as more 
information is retrieved. This could be challenging as it sometimes felt like my 
case was shifting and moving and was hard to get a grip on. The flexible design 
thus requires patience and keeping a cool head even though the case may seem 
slightly chaotic underway. 
 
 
 38 
4.3 The case study 
The case study has often been accused of not being scientific enough or a “soft 
option” by the positivist “standard view” of science, an accusation that is now 
strongly refuted. Robert Yin has been given the credit for having rehabilitated the 
case study as an independent approach in line with quantitative studies (Andersen 
1997:5, Robson 2011:137). According to Yin (2009), the case study is well-
suited for holistic analysis of real-life events, such as organizational and 
managerial processes. Yin puts forward three conditions that render a case study 
appropriate: a) the form of the research question is explanatory, b) the researcher 
does not exert control over events, and c) the study focuses on contemporary 
events (Yin 2009:8). All these criteria apply to my data, and the case study seems 
like a well-fitted type of study (or type of research method according to Yin’s 
categorization). I seek to explain why Norway and Guyana entered into 
partnership, which is a contemporary event completely outside of my control.  
 
In performing a case study one may choose to study either a single or multiple 
case study design. According to Yin, a single case study can be defended if the 
case is representative for a mechanism or a type of cases, or if it is extreme or 
can provide revelatory new insights (Yin 2009:47-50). My study is a mixture of 
these circumstances. According to my informants, the Guyana partnership is the 
most disputed of the NICFI partnerships. It is the bilateral agreement that has 
caused the starkest disagreements concerning priorities of NICFI. In that way it 
can be seen as an extreme case. But the majority of the Norwegian informants 
also argued that the case is representative for a larger tendency: namely, that of 
using aid more politically and thus moving away from traditional developmental 
concerns. In that way some of my findings may be representative of a broader 
tendency. I do not, however, have sufficient grounds to assert that the case is 
representative, either for NICFI or for aid allocations more generally. To reach 
that conclusion, more research would have to be conducted. I will argue that the 
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case represents, in a somewhat extreme way, differences of priorities within 
different branches dealing with NICFI in the Norwegian government.  
 
4.3.1 Yin’s three principles 
In conducting the data-collection for this single case design I have tried to follow 
Yin’s three principles. These are: a) using multiple sources of evidence, b) 
creating a case-study database, and c) maintaining a chain of evidence (Yin 
2009:98). I have relied most heavily on interviews, with actors holding differing 
positions and views on the subject matter. Archival records have been important 
to complement my interviews and to gain another type of insight. I have searched 
the online Norwegian government postal archive, whose documents have been 
important guides for asking relevant questions. I found them, as Yin also holds 
(2009:103), a good complementary source.  
 
Another source has been Norwegian and Guyanese newspapers, although to a 
lesser extent. Newspapers will always have some degree of bias, as shown in a 
study by Jacobs referred to by Yin (2009:104). This is indeed the case of the two 
Guyanese newspapers that I have used in my study. Guyana Chronicle Online 
supports the government and writes accordingly, whereas Stabroek News is 
highly critical and vocally opposes many government decisions. These facts are 
important to bear in mind when analyzing the articles’ content. Knowing the 
bias, reading these newspapers have been a valuable source of evidence in my 
study. 
 
A possible weakness in the sources of evidence is the lack of participant 
observation. I have not managed to attend seminars or meetings about the 
partnership. Notwithstanding, this study does in a way exhibit some features of 
the participant-observer role. Preceding the work on the thesis I spent six months 
as an intern at the Norwegian embassy in Brazil where I reported on REDD-
relevant issues in Guyana. This stay, although not officially part of the fieldwork, 
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did share similarities with the participant-observer role, and can in some ways be 
likened to a source of evidence. One very important difference, however, is that I 
cannot use information from this period directly in the thesis. Notwithstanding, 
the stay did provide me with significant background information and helped me 
triangulate information gathered in my data collection. It helped me develop an 
overview of the important actors both in Norway and Guyana, and thus greatly 
facilitated the fieldwork and access to relevant informants. 
 
My case study database consists of interview transcripts and background 
documents. I have classified the documents according to content and type of 
data. This database is not formalized so that other researchers can access it, 
which would be ideal but is seldom the case with case studies (Yin 2009:119). 
Still, theoretically, if asked, I could be able to provide the data for alternative 
analysis by others. By including a list of my informants, and always referring to 
interviews or other data sources, I have tried to make clear and open which type 
of data I have used for my analysis. This quest for transparency is an important 
principle in order to facilitate verification of the data’s reliability (Yin 2009:45 
and 122).  
4.4 Process-tracing  
When deciding on a methodology, the research question is steering. The methods 
chosen are means to answer the research questions, so depending on the question, 
one chooses the best-suited methods to answer it (Everett and Furseth 2004). My 
research question is Why and how the agreement was made. When dealing with 
explanatory analysis, process-tracing is a type of method commonly used. 
According to George and Bennett (2005), process tracing attempts to trace links 
between possible causes and observed outcomes. However, it is not enough to 
establish a correlation between two outcomes. Ideally, one must be able to trace 
the causal movement or process, step by step (George and Bennett 2005). In my 
thesis, the observed outcome is the agreement, and the causes are the ones I 
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identify in the analysis. I will not however perform a detailed process tracing, but 
rather point to some of the factors outlined by the FPA framework and analyze 
how these factors may explain the agreement. 
 
A common challenge is to convincingly establish causality. How can one be 
positive that one thing led to the other, and that other factors were not in fact 
more important? Through process tracing the researcher may at a minimum 
establish a lack of causality or influence. This may be the case when one event 
could not have caused another as it occurred subsequently. An example of this is 
demonstrated by the fact that the risk assessment was made after the decision of 
a partnership, see chapter 5.1.1. In this thesis I will not claim to have accounted 
for every factor and every step towards the decision taken place. I may have 
overlooked factors, or factors may have been impossible to find evidence for. 
What I best can hope for is to have given an account for the process of this 
decision-making and a plausible analysis of important factors that influenced the 
decision. 
 
4.5 Interviews and interview situations 
4.5.1 The informants 
I have conducted in total 36 focused interviews with various stakeholders in 
Norway and in Guyana.
14
 My informants were chosen on the basis of their 
knowledge and involvement in the partnership and in REDD in general. In 
Guyana, I wanted to interview a wide variety of both governmental and civil 
society stakeholders, as I wanted to get fuller background information and 
contextual knowledge of the case. It was also an asset to get outsiders’ views on 
the Norwegian involvement in the country. Their perceptions of the Norwegian 
                                              
14 See appendix I for complete list of informants 
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motivations for the partnership provided valuable insight used to contrast and 
compare to the answers given by Norwegian actors involved in the process. 
 
In Norway I limited the majority of the informants to the ones more directly 
involved to be able to give an accurate account of the main actors involved in the 
decision, in tune with my actor-specific framework that puts weight on the 
perceptions of the decision-makers. But also here I included more independent 
informants who could comment with an outsider’s view. In table one is a 
categorization of my informants. 
Table 1 Overview of informants 
Country/affiliation Norway Guyana 
Government officials 
In Norway: 15 
In Guyana: 4 
Total: 19 
NICFI-Ministry of 
Environment  
NICFI/Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs  
Minister of International 
Development and the 
Environment 
Norad  
Guyana Forestry 
Commission 
Office of the President 
Consultant to the 
Government 
NGOs 
In Norway: 2 
In Guyana: 7 
Total: 9 
 
Rainforest Foundation 
Norway 
WWF Norway 
Conservation 
International 
Multi-Stakeholder 
Steering Committee 
(MSSC) 
AmerIndian Peoples 
Association (APA) 
Guyana Gold & 
Diamond Miners 
association 
Multilateral 
organizations 
In Norway: 0 
In Guyana:3 
Total: 3 
 The World Bank 
UNDP 
IDB 
Journalist/other 
In Norway: 1 
In Guyana: 4 
Total: 5 
Development Today Stabroek News 
DFID 
Canadian High 
Commission 
PhD (LSE) on GRIF  
Total: 36 Total: 18 Total: 18 
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4.5.2 Access 
Most of my interviews were typical elite interviews with top bureaucrats. As 
Aberbach and Rockman (2002) note, access to busy officials can be quite 
difficult, and it is important to be “politely persistent”. It is useful to have a 
“spiel” prepared for the appointments secretary (Aberbach and Rockman 
2002:673-674). This was true especially in Guyana, where all interview requests 
had to be arranged through phone calls with various secretaries. In Norway, the 
process of arranging interviews was more straight-forward, with e-mails being 
sent directly to the informants. I find that it was possible to gain access and 
schedule interviews as long as I was flexible with the timing. Several of the 
interviews were re-scheduled in the last minute, so I had to be patient and re-
schedule. One of the interviews was hampered by several interruptions; phone 
calls and people knocking on the door, before the whole interview had to be 
stopped as the Minister called in for a rush meeting.  
 
Five informants declined the interview request. Some did so because they were 
on leave, but some also said they had not worked with Guyana in a long time and 
that it felt wrong to make statements about the partnership as they no longer 
worked with it. It may be that the Guyana case was especially sensitive, as there 
have been disagreements around it. For some it was perhaps more comfortable 
not being involved. This may have affected the data basis negatively as the ones 
who declined possibly could have altered my impression.  
 
But as the vast majority of the central actors agreed to meet, I will argue that the 
informant basis is a thorough one. In Norway, former Minister Solheim became a 
key informant whose statements were important in my analysis. In Guyana I tried 
persistently to get an appointment with former President Jagdeo, which in the end 
I did not get. I did manage to interview his closest adviser on climate, Mr. Shyam 
Nokta and the main advisor for Guyana to the GRIF, Mr. Steven Grin. I used the 
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“snowball effect”, asking informants who they would recommend I talk to. This 
is a useful approach when there is difficulty in identifying who would be relevant 
informants (Robson 2011:276), although the researcher must ensure that the 
overall selection of informants does not become biased. In my case, the 
“snowball method” had the positive effect of facilitating access, as most 
informants accepted interviews when they heard they had been recommended by 
someone they knew. 
4.5.3 Conducting the interviews 
I used the method of open-ended semistructured interviews, each lasting for 
about one hour. Semistructured interviews with open-ended questions represent a 
style commonly used in elite interviewing (Leech 2002:665). When the 
informants allowed it, I used a tape recorder; otherwise I tried to take as accurate 
notes as possible underway. Only three informants asked not to be recorded, and 
these were also the ones that did not wish to be quoted.  In Norway the 
interviews were conducted between April and November 2012, and in Guyana 
they were conducted during a two-week fieldwork in June 2012. 
 
The location varied between the informants’ offices or at a café. I let the 
informants decide time and place, both to fit busy schedules and to allow them to 
choose a place where they felt comfortable. I often found that the interviews that 
were not conducted in the offices became more relaxed and familiar. In that way, 
the location of the interview mattered. Several of the informants said after the 
interview: “I have told you much more than I had planned”.  For me as an 
interviewer that is a sign that the interview situation works, and that it is a useful 
way to retrieve information that may be otherwise difficult to get hold of. 
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4.5.4 Insider and outsider 
Having background information and having worked as an intern with the issue at 
hand also functioned as a door-opener. I found that especially my informants in 
the MFA became more familiar and open when they knew I had “inside-
information” from my own experience at the embassy. Their attitude changed, 
and they became more open and relaxed towards me. I became more of an insider 
than the typical “outsider” role of the researcher. This also posed some 
challenges, as some of my informants were open and willing to share and discuss 
during the interview, but did not wish to be quoted. I therefore found that I had to 
present that information using other sources instead of using direct quotations. 
4.5.5 On anonymity and quotations 
Many of my informants asked not to be quoted, or to be quoted as anonymous 
informants. My Norwegian informants were generally more worried about being 
quoted than my informants in Guyana and some asked not to be quoted as a pre-
requisite for discussing the Guyana partnership, they only wanted to “give 
background information”. There is naturally a trade-off between offering 
anonymity and the principle of reliability; the transparency is diminished when 
the researcher cannot state who said what. I sent the quotations to be used in the 
thesis for approval from the respective informants. Some of the quotations were 
amended by the informants and one asked all the quotations to be paraphrased 
and not quoted directly. This created some extra work and a few quotations that I 
could not use, but here the concern for the informants weighed more heavily.  
4.6 Documents: access and analysis 
The other main method used in this thesis is document analysis. I have studied 
the two White Papers that are most relevant to the study of climate-related aid, 
namely the Climate, Conflict and Capital and Interests, Responsibilities and 
Opportunities. I have also asked for access to several documents in the 
Norwegian official electronic archive (OEP). This is a service that allows the 
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public to “follow the political decision-making process on the internet across 
departmental and agency boundaries. Government agencies publish their public 
records via OEP, and your order for access will be sent to the responsible 
agency.” 15 
Here I have received central documents that have confirmed the findings from 
my interviews. One document that proved very useful is the decision document 
concerning the agreement with the World Bank to channel money to Guyana, 
made by the MFA team dealing with NICFI (MFA 2010). Here the differences of 
opinion between the two ministries are exemplified with separate points stating 
where KOS in ME does not agree with the considerations made by MFA. Many 
of the documents I have asked for have been classified as “exempted from the 
public,” and therefore I have been denied access. Especially documents about on-
going processes and negotiations or internal working documents were not 
disclosed. For example, documents regarding potential changes to the GRIF have 
been difficult to access. The analysis might have been fuller had I gained access 
to all relevant documents. Irretrievability and inaccessibility are two of the 
weaknesses for this type of data (Yin 2009:102). According to Yin, the most 
important function of documents is “to corroborate and augment evidence from 
other sources” (ibid.:103). In my study, interviews with a wide range of relevant 
actors have been the main sources of evidence, whereas the documents have 
served the role of testing my findings, giving clues as to relevant questions to 
ask, and verifying factual details such as correct dates and names. 
 
                                              
15 Quoted from oep.no (Accessed 07.11.12). All documents that are not openly available to the public 
have been retrieved from this electronic public records service, except the Norad risk assessment (Norad 
2010). This was requested through a phone call to Norad, and access was given December 5, 2011. 
 47 
4.7 Generalization and Validity 
The main objection to case studies is that is does not tell one much beyond the 
specific case being studied. Very rarely does a case study involve representative 
sampling from a known population, to provide the kind of statistical sampling 
typical for surveys  (Robson 2011:160). This is true for my case study as well, 
although my informants argued that the Guyana case did shed light on some 
mechanisms that are apparent also in discussions around NICFI in general. 
Through the case it becomes apparent that there are two differing views 
prevailing in ME and MFA. The Guyana case is a striking exemplification of 
these differing views. The two opinions are very starkly opposed to each other in 
the Guyana case, because there have been disagreements concerning the choice 
of country from the very beginning. But the underlying differences of opinion 
that I analyze are also observable in other REDD partnerships, many informants 
pointed out. Thus although I have not done sufficient research to justify 
generalizing from this case, the prevailing view in my interviews is that the 
Guyana case in a somewhat intense or focused way shows a significant 
difference of opinion that exists in the MFA and in the ME concerning NICFI. In 
that way, this thesis can provide the reader an understanding of some 
mechanisms that underlie NICFI. It might also give an understanding of how aid 
decisions can be made under certain circumstances. However, this is not to say 
that all aid decisions are marked by these dynamics, or that the next REDD 
country will be elected in the same manner. 
 
The purpose of a case study is “not to represent the world, but to represent the 
case” (Stake 1994:245). In other words, a case study is not to be judged by the 
extent to which it is generally representative, but rather the extent to which it is 
true to the case itself. Making sure that the study accurately represents the case 
concerns the case study’s trustworthiness or its validity.  In qualitative research a 
possible operationalization of the concept may be found in Maxwell’s typology 
of possible threats to validity. This typology deals with accurateness and 
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transparency in the description of the case material, interpretation and use of 
theory (Maxwell 1996 referred to in Robson 2011:156). Another way of 
achieving is following Yin’s three principles of data collection, as described in 
chapter 4.Throughout the work on this Master’s thesis I have aimed at ensuring 
validity at all stages, from data collection through the writing of the thesis. 
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5. The Norway-Guyana Partnership 
 
In the analysis to come I discuss why Norway chose to enter into partnership with 
Guyana.  But to understand why, I find it necessary first to account for what 
actually happened and how it happened. In this light, this chapter is to be seen as 
a preparation for the analysis to come. I will start by providing a chronological 
account of what happened before and around the making of the partnership. Then 
I explain how the partnership is set up with the making of a trust fund in the 
World Bank.   
5.1 What happened? 
As decisions may be moderated over time, one might be required to study a 
series of decisions, rather than just one single decision (Hudson, 2007:4). Thus 
the following is a chronological account of the main events that led to the 
Norway-Guyana partnership. In the tradition of process-tracing, such 
chronological accounts can shed light on possible causality as well as establish 
non-causality. In addition I will provide a more detailed account of the Low 
Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS), as it represents a key document for 
Guyana and will be referred to throughout the analysis. 
 
5.1.1 Guyana and Norway: tracing the process 
 
Below are the main benchmarks extracted from my interviews and analysis of 
documents, represented in a list of key events. This list will give the reader a 
general overview of what actually happened, which is necessary in order to 
appreciate an analysis of why it happened. The following account is my 
interpretation based primarily on interviews of Pharo and Solheim, the GRIF 
website, the LCDS website, the GRIF decision document (MFA 2010) and 
Norad’s risk assessment (Norad 2010). 
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1. Guyana’s President Bharrat Jagdeo and Norwegian Environment 
Minister Erik Solheim meet several times during 2008 and 2009 at 
international conferences.
16
 
2. On contact initiated by Guyana, under the UN General Assembly in the 
autumn of 2008, leader of KOS Hans Brattskar and deputy leader Per 
Fredrik Pharo meet with President Jagdeo, Climate advisor Shyam 
Nokta, and advisor Kevin Hogan. 
3. Just after the turn of the year, in early 2009 all the above-mentioned 
actors except President Jagdeo and Minister Solheim meet again in 
Washington, and discuss the main principles for a potential 
partnership. They find that they agree on the main points.   
4. In February 2009 President Jagdeo visits Norway and has an official 
meeting with Norway’s Prime Minister Stoltenberg. A joint statement 
released on February 3, 2009 states that Norway and Guyana will 
collaborate both bilaterally and towards the inclusion of REDD in a 
post-Kyoto agreement at the international climate negotiations. It is 
stated that “Norway is prepared to provide performance-based, 
substantial and sustained compensation for the progress Guyana makes 
in limiting emissions from deforestation at low levels and further 
decreasing forest degradation”17 
5. In April 2009 Prime Minister Samuel Hind of Guyana and Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg both attend a meeting to discuss the importance of 
                                              
16 I have been unable to get a more concrete account of when and how Minister Solheim and President 
Jagdeo actually met. Minister Solheim says he cannot recall exactly when they first talked, only that they 
had met several times at various international conferences. 
17 See http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/nyheter/2009/samarbeid-norge-guyana-for-a-
redusere-kl/joint-statement-on-climate-and-forest-is.html?id=544715. 
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rainforests hosted by HRH Prince of Wales of world leaders at St 
James’s Palace.18  
6. The first version of Guyana’s LCDS is launched in June 2009. The 
LCDS is a document that outlines a low-carbon development plan for 
the country and is titled “Transforming Guyana’s Economy While 
Combating Climate Change”.  
7. KOS staff member Marte Nordseth and KOS deputy leader Per-Fredrik 
Pharo work on project documents. Reports are prepared by the Centre 
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) assessing forestry 
and governance in the forest sector. In this period MFA express 
worries about lack of Norwegian presence and experience in Guyana 
but do not actively try to stop the agreement. 
8. October 6, 2009: The support to Guyana is being discussed by the 
Norwegian ministries. The government decides to initiate a result-
based Climate and Forest partnership with Guyana. 
9. November 9, 2009: The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a 
first joint concept note (JCN) are signed in Guyana by President 
Jagdeo and Minister Solheim. Norway pledges to provide Guyana up 
to 250 million US dollars (USD) in the period 2010 to 2015, equaling 
about 1.5 billion NOK. The document is politically binding, although 
not legally binding. 
10. March 8 to 11, 2010: A delegation from ME and MFA visits Guyana 
on a so-called “fact-finding mission.” They meet with actors from the 
government, civil society, and donor community. 
11. September 24, 2010: Norad finalizes a risk report on Guyana entitled 
“Assessment of Potential Risks Associated with REDD+ Cooperation 
with Guyana.” A draft version of the report was available March 2010. 
                                              
18 See 
http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/newsandgallery/news/hrh_hosts_a_meeting_of_world_leaders_at_st_ja
mes_s_palace_to_2060520190.html Accessed 10.10.12 
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12. October 2010: The Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF) is 
established with the World Bank as Trustee. 
13. November 7, 2011: The first project is approved by the GRIF: 
Institutional Strengthening in Support of Guyana’s LCDS. 
 
It is difficult to state at what exact point the decision of entering into partnership 
was actually made. Rather than a specific point in time, it was the whole 
decision-making process that was significant. The MOU was perhaps the most 
important benchmark, as from then on it was clear that the partnership would 
happen. The objective of the MoU is  
to foster partnership between Guyana and Norway on issues of 
climate change, biodiversity and sustainable, low carbon 
development. Of particular importance is the establishment of a 
comprehensive political and policy dialogue on these issues, and close 
cooperation regarding Guyana’s REDD-plus efforts, including the 
establishment of a framework for result-based Norwegian financial 
support to Guyana’s REDD-plus efforts (Governments of Guyana and 
Norway 2009). 
 
 But the MoU is not a legally binding document, only expressing political will. 
According to the current leader of KOS Per Fredrik Pharo (interview), Norway is 
in a quite unique position in the way that political statements and promises are 
actually taken seriously by other countries; it is expected that Norway delivers as 
stated and that Norway will live up to promises made. Here I will treat the 
decision of entering into partnership with Guyana as a process, with the MoU 
signed in November 2009 as an important step but not the definite point in time 
that defined the decision. Hence, events that happened after November 2009 will 
also form part of the analysis. 
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5.1.2 The Low Carbon Development Strategy  
As seen above, the LCDS was launched in June 2009. It is an important 
document, often referred to in my interviews. As its title indicates, it is a 
development plan that stakes out a course for the country based on a low-carbon 
trajectory. The LCDS is subject to regular updates and the last version was 
released in May 2010. Here, the main areas for investments in a low carbon 
future are highlighted. The most important component is the building of a 
hydropower plant, called Amaila Falls. Through this hydropower plant Guyana 
can exchange expensive and unreliable diesel imported from neighboring 
countries with clean energy. The plant is planned in the Amazon region, and it is 
estimated to cause deforestation of 4500 hectares. But the overall output is said 
to have a positive effect, and Amaila Falls is the flagship of the LCDS: “Yes, it 
does lead to certain deforestation, but it does also lead to access to clean energy 
which has a more positive net effect” (interview, Pharo). The building of Amaila 
Falls has been warned against by RFN, who points to the construction of a new 
road, which is very often the first step towards increased deforestation. That has 
invariably been the case for example in Brazil (interview, Olsen). 
 
Other important areas are the development fund and land titling for Amerindian 
populations. Land titling and demarcation is a contested area in Guyana, with 
nine percent of its population being Amerindian. The LCDS also outlines 
investments in green small-scale business development and an increased focus on 
climate change and biodiversity in research and education. The last point of the 
strategy is institutional strengthening of the key national institutions that are to 
follow up the LCDS. These include a Ministry of Environment, an office of 
climate change, Guyana’s follow-up of GRIF, a REDD secretariat, and a project 
management office (Government of Guyana: 2010).  
 
The critics say the LCDS is little other than a regular development plan, that the 
Amaila Falls will in itself lead to vast deforestation, and that other alternatives 
have not sufficiently been examined (interview, Trædal and Olsen). Still, the 
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LCDS makes Guyana one of few developing countries with a clear idea of a 
green national development. 
 
The next section examines in more detail how the partnership is set up and the 
specific set-up of the GRIF. 
 
5.2 How it happened: the set-up of the GRIF 
From the inception it was clear for ME that it would have been difficult to 
partner directly with Guyana (Interview, Solheim, Bendiksby). They needed a 
multi-lateral institution, so that Norway did not need to handle the risk of 
corruption and securing safeguards alone. The GRIF was set up with the World 
Bank as trustee in October 2010. According to the official GRIF webpage, “the 
GRIF represents an effort to create an innovative climate finance mechanism 
which balances national sovereignty over investment priorities while ensuring 
that REDD+ funds adhere to the highest internationally recognized standards for 
financial, environmental and social safeguards” (GRIF 2011). This is a 
temporary mechanism, pending the creation of an international REDD+ 
mechanism, and in that way it is innovative and a test case. As is clear from 
figure three on the following page, it is a quite complex structure. 
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What is the organizational structure of the GRIF? 
The GRIF has the following structure: 
Steering Committee: (Norway and Guyana) – The governing body of the GRIF, chaired 
by Guyana, that reviews and approves projects. Guyana and Norway are the only 
voting members. The World Bank as Trustee, Partner Entities and civil society 
members participate as observers. The first Steering Committee meeting was held by 
videoconference on November 24, 2010. 
Secretariat: Prepares operational manuals and procedures, facilitates Steering 
Committee meetings and decisions, processes project proposals, and manages public 
communication. As an interim solution, the Governments of Norway and Guyana will 
constitute the Secretariat and provide necessary administrative support to the Steering 
Committee for the operation of the GRIF. 
Trustee: The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) was invited by 
the Governments of Guyana and Norway to act as Trustee and will be responsible for 
providing financial intermediary services to the GRIF. The Trustee signs contribution 
agreements with donors, receives and holds GRIF funds, transfers funds to Partner 
Entities upon project approval by the Steering Committee and requests from the 
Partner Entities, and provides financial reporting. 
 
Partner Entities: (IDB, UNDP and the World Bank) – Partner Entities submit projects to 
the Steering Committee for approval, receive funds and supervise projects according 
to their own fiduciary, social and environmental safeguards and operational policies 
and procedures, and report on implementation progress and results. 
Implementing Entities: (Guyana Ministries or any other eligible entities according to 
Partner Entity policies and procedures) – Receive funds from the Partner Entities to 
implement projects. Partner Entities will enter into agreements with Implementing 
Entities, which will receive funds from the Partner Entities and be responsible for the 
implementation of the relevant project or activity. These may include the Government 
of Guyana or any other entity that is eligible for funding in accordance with the relevant 
policies, guidelines and procedures of the Partner Entity and approved by the Steering 
Committee. 
 
 
Figure 3 Institutional set-up of GRIF 
Source: www.worldbank.org/grif 
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In summary, the money flow will go 1) from Norway to the World Bank, based 
on continued low deforestation rates in Guyana, 2) from the World Bank to the 
Partner entities after they submit projects and they are approved by the steering 
committee, then 3) from the Partner entities to Guyana Ministries to actual 
project implementation. Each project is carried out by the Partner Entities, which 
are the Inter-American Development bank (IDB), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank together with a Ministry or 
other entity in Guyana. All projects are part of Guyana’s LCDS, but must follow 
the safeguards of the specific Partner Entity in each case. 
 
The set-up is subject to continuous discussions between Guyana, the World 
Bank, and Norway. The point of controversy is the degree of safeguards attached 
to the money. Guyana has on several occasions expressed discontent with the fact 
that the vast majority of the money is still in the World Bank. According to the 
latest report on the financial status of the GRIF dated May 2012, a total of 69.8 
million USD has been transferred from Norway to the World Bank, whereas only 
7.2 million is transferred to partner entities. That means that 63 million USD, or 
90 percent, is still waiting in the World Bank.  
5.2.1 A hands-off-approach 
Having the World Bank as Trustee of the GRIF makes it possible for Norway to 
play a limited role. One informant from the donor community said with reference 
to the 69.8 million USD transferred from Norway to GRIF: “This is huge 
amounts of money. And that’s only parts of it! Up to 250 million is to be spent. 
I’m sure Norwegian taxpayers would want some people to be there managing it, 
you know, hands on” (interview, anonymous). 
 
Both representatives from the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and the World Bank said in interviews that they offered 
office space to Norwegian bureaucrats, in order for them to be more involved in 
the projects on the ground. But Norway did not take the offer. When asked, the 
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NICFI office in the ME says they cannot recall any such offer: “I think presence 
is important and positive, but it does not solve all our problems. There will still 
be challenges” (interview, Brattskar).  Another informant in NICFI says that it is 
possible to evaluate progress without a presence in Guyana, through regular 
visits and reports from the World Bank and UN system in addition to reports 
from the Embassy in Brasilia: “We get reports on the implementation of the 
agreed enabling activities and interim performance indicators, plus independent 
verification of those reports. We also follow the media coverage both there and 
elsewhere” (interview, Tveteraas). However, the verification has been criticized, 
among others from the Rainforest Foundation in Norway (RFN) for focusing too 
much on interviews with government officials and not the affected populations. 
This is expressed in a letter to the former leader of KOS, Hans Brattskar, from 
five organizations including RFN. Other informants in Guyana use words like 
“amazing” that Norway has no one on the ground in Guyana considering the vast 
amount of money involved. 
 
The involvement of a multilateral partner worked as a risk mitigation measure. 
Trusting the safeguards of the World Bank, Norway was not left alone with the 
responsibility partnering with a country where there were issues of corruption 
and lack of transparency. Steven Grin, a Wall Street economist who has been 
Guyana’s consultant in the GRIF, explains: “The fact that there were no prior 
relations between Norway and Guyana means there was no trust. I don’t want to 
use the word mistrust, but no trust. Therefore it has taken time to build that trust” 
(interview, Grin). It was because of this lack of prior experience and lack of trust 
that a trust fund had to be made. But according to one informant this was 
problematic, as Norway let the World Bank be “the bad guy in the middle” 
having to take all the criticism (interview, anonymous). According to this 
informant, the relationship between Guyana and the World Bank has become 
considerably worse since the partnership began. 
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I will now proceed to my main question, namely why Norway chose Guyana as a 
REDD partner. I will look at international, domestic and governmental factors to 
explain and analyze the question. 
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6. Why did Norway enter into REDD-partnership 
with Guyana? 
In this main part of this thesis I discuss why Norway entered into partnership 
with Guyana using the FPA framework. I will structure my findings according to 
my theoretical framework adapted from Hill (2003): international, domestic and 
governmental politics. I thus aim to show that all three aspects played an 
important part in the decision-making, and that FPA proves a fruitful lens 
through which the partnership can be analyzed. As Hill convincingly argues, all 
three aspects are important, and no all-encompassing perspective can explain a 
foreign policy outcome satisfactorily.  But first, what were the official reasons 
Norway chose Guyana for REDD partnership? 
 
On the official NICFI material Guyana’s historically low deforestation is 
highlighted: “To provide a working example of how to incentivize countries with 
high forest coverage and low deforestation, Norway and Guyana entered into a 
climate and forest partnership in November 2009” (NICFI 2012). Also on 
Norad’s webpage on Norway’s aid relationship with Guyana, it is stated that the 
country was chosen because it has shown great political will both nationally and 
internationally to take care of its forests and thus contribute greatly to the fight 
against climate change
 
(Norad 2011). The fact that Guyana is a high coverage-
low deforestation country was the starting point. But there were other alternatives 
with that feature, like Congo and Gabon. Papua New Guinea was also discussed 
but found politically unmanageable (interview, Pharo). 
Thus three features have been highlighted as features that made Guyana an 
attractive REDD partner: 1) a high coverage-low deforestation country (Norway 
was actively seeking a country that could represent this group); 2) strong political 
will with a very active president, and 3) it was small enough so that the 
Norwegian funds could actually make a difference. In fact, there were very few 
other options available that had all these features (interview, Pharo). One detail 
that also is worth mentioning is that Guyana is the only one out of the countries 
 60 
mentioned as possible alternatives that is English-speaking. That has not been 
hailed as an important aspect in my interviews, but it may also have helped 
facilitate contact. Most importantly though, according to Pharo, Guyana was 
looked upon as a visionary country that matched well with what Norway wanted 
to achieve with NICFI. This was because Guyana was willing to: “a) maintain 
deforestation at its extremely low historical level, b) spend the money ‘earned’ 
from REDD+ on climate adaptation and a transition to a low carbon economy, 
including renewable energy, and c) through a pay for performance approach” 
(interview, Pharo). It was a perfect package for KOS: “At a general level, this is 
a win-win value proposition from our point of view” (interview, Pharo). 
The above-mentioned features are all important aspects that provide a partial 
answer to the research question Why did Norway enter into REDD+ partnership 
with Guyana? But in order to provide a complete and comprehensive answer, I 
will dig deeper into a wider range of influences, from international norms and 
networks to the institutional set-up of NICFI. To understand the different factors 
that made Norway choose Guyana, I will analyze international, domestic and 
governmental factors. International factors include global climate change and the 
emergence of REDD which provided a context that made a large-scale climate 
initiative in relation to forests possible. President Jagdeo is important as an actor 
on the international arena, connected to Norway through government networks.  
Nationally there are fewer factors directly providing explanations for the 
Norway-Guyana partnership, but it is important to the analysis to explain how 
NICFI could become reality. When analyzing domestic explanations, I discuss 
the four Ps as developed by Hill (2003). Here both public opinion and pressure 
groups played a crucial role in making NICFI happen, but did not advocate 
Guyana specifically. 
My last part visualizes the importance of an actor-specific analysis, which takes 
perceptions of key actors seriously. Here, we find that different opinions in the 
Norwegian political landscape and in the bureaucracy prevailed, but that the 
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choice of Guyana as REDD partner became a political decision. The decision 
would go through no matter the objections from the aid bureaucracy who worried 
about lack of experience and risks of corruption. The partnership was to serve as 
a model and it was important to cast it as a success story. This was a climate 
political decision first, and an aid allocation second. 
6.1 The international level 
6.1.1 Deforestation and global climate change 
NICFI is a large-scale climate initiative and must be understood in the context of 
global climate change. According to Lunde and Thune et al. (2008): 
19
  
 
It is difficult to envisage an area where global interconnections are 
more evident and borders between nation states less relevant than that 
of climate. The global climate challenge is the very quintessence of the 
new demands being made of foreign policy in a world of merging 
social systems, erasing in practice the borders between countries 
(Lunde and Thune et al. 2008:80). 
 
After 2006 most policy makers agreed that the seriousness of climate change was 
undeniable. The Stern Review and the IPCC report added momentum to the plea 
of forested countries that advocated a REDD regime, which up until then had 
been seen as “interesting, but a little bit on the side” (interview, Tveteraas).20 On 
                                              
19 Their book National Interest. Foreign policy for a globalized world, the case of Norway is issued as 
part of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Refleks-project, but is meant to be an independent 
contribution and not the official view of the Norwegian government or Foreign Ministry. 
20 Whenever a quotation has been translated from Norwegian without the informants having reviewed 
the English version, I will provide the original quotations. Most of the quotations have been sent to 
informants for approval and alterations have then been made directly in the English versions. In these 
cases, I do not find it necessary to add the original Norwegian quotations. Minister Solheim did not 
request his quotations for approval, and I have therefore added the Norwegian translation to his 
quotations. 
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the one hand the reports made it clear that climate change was a serious threat, 
and on the other they suggested reduced deforestation measures as a cost-
effective measure to fight it. It was estimated that deforestation accounted for 
almost a fifth of global greenhouse gas emissions, and thus it was a sector that 
had to be included in a global climate regime. 
The situation of the international climate negotiations and the 
seriousness which was clear after the IPCC-report made us actively 
seeking large-scale solutions. The sum of the climate debate 
contributed to the possibility of such an ambitious project as this one 
(interview, Tveteraas). 
 
Here, Tveteraas refers to NICFI as a whole. But to establish a large scale REDD 
initiative technological developments were crucial. The last years have seen a 
rapid growth of monitoring systems, which made it possible to verify actual 
deforestation. NICFI could not have become operational had that not been the 
case (interview, Brattskar). 
This context was without doubt important to make Norway take a large-scale 
climate and forest initiative. But in order to explain the specific country case 
Guyana, I will look at Anne Marie Slaughter’s notion of government networks. 
According to her, it is in these global arenas that one must look to understand 
today’s real-world decisions. 
6.1.2 REDD as PES: an economic fix 
Important in the REDD paradigm is the notion of PES (Payment for Ecosystem 
Services). A PES scheme is defined by CIFOR as “a voluntary transaction in 
which a well-defined environmental service (ES), or a form of land use likely to 
secure that service, is bought by at least one ES buyer from a minimum of one 
ES provider, if and only if the provider continues to supply that service 
(conditionality)” (CIFOR 2011). The idea is that the ES provider, be it an 
individual farmer or a state, provides a service by (in the case of REDD) 
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abstaining from deforesting. In the PES scheme there are no demands as to how 
the service provider spends the money. The conditionality lies in continued 
supply of the service, meaning continued low or even lowered deforestation 
rates. 
Thus, PES is driven by an inherently economic logic. Interesting in this regard is 
that the two main negotiators from the Guyanese delegation are two economists 
hired as consultants, Steven Grin and Kevin Hogan. Both have been repeatedly 
referred to in my interviews as very central actors in making the partnership 
happen. In Norway, the REDD idea may have appealled particularly to Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg, also being an economist. Ever since Stoltenberg was a state 
secretary in ME in the early nineties, he has been advocating that the climate 
crisis must be solved in an economically reasonable way. The main actors 
involved on both the Norway and Guyana sides can be seen as part of this larger 
epistemic community. One feature of epistemic communities is that they define 
some aspects of reality. They agree on one version of reality and out-define 
others. In this case I will argue that particularly developmental aspects of REDD 
were given less emphasis, which is an argument I further develop in the section 
on governmental politics. The negotiations dealt with economic terms and the 
negotiators were World Bank officials and economic consultants. This fact 
underscores the point made in the section above: namely, that this was first and 
foremost seen as a partnership dealing with Payment for Ecosystem Services, and 
thus should be dealt with in economic and financial terms.  
PES differs from traditional foreign aid, which is not to be used freely but rather 
on pre-defined developmental objectives. Norway’s REDD partnership with 
Guyana is influenced by the PES idea, but the money used comes from the 
foreign aid budget. This is a contested issue, which I will come back to in chapter 
six and seven. Here it suffices to say that NICFI was established as a PES 
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initiative, but that the only possible way to make it happen was through the aid 
budget (interview, Solheim).
21
 
There is also a moral stance apparent among my KOS informants: namely, that 
Western countries have historically polluted the atmosphere and must be the ones 
paying for the damage. One of the NICFI officials said:  
These are models for collaboration, partnerships between a rich 
country like Norway and poor countries where there is less of a donor 
and aid recipient relationship. They provide a global service; they 
take care of the world’s rainforests and thus help mitigating climate 
change. That is a service we ought to reward (interview, Tveteraas).  
 
But the incentive-based economic logic in PES may meet difficulties on the 
ground, especially in states like Guyana. An article by Karsenty and Ongolo 
(2011) is one of very few studies that address Guyana in particular. The authors 
question the very basis of REDD in their paper, instructively entitled “Can 
‘fragile states’ decide to reduce their deforestation? The inappropriate use of the 
theory of incentives with respect to the REDD mechanism.” In this article 
Karsenty and Ongolo sow doubt about the ability of “fragile states” to implement 
the appropriate policies and measures, based on a cost-benefit analysis of 
anticipated financial rewards (Karsenty and Ongolo:2011:38).  
When discussing Guyana in particular they critically question the hypothetic 
baseline scenario developed for the country. This was developed by McKinsey 
and entitled “Economically rational land-use scenario.” In this scenario, 90 
percent of Guyana’s forests are to be converted into industrial crops over the next 
25 years, which means that Guyana’s deforestation rate would become 4.3 
percent per year (Karsenty and Ongolo 2011:42), as opposed to 0.03 percent, 
which is the current rate. 
                                              
21 I will discuss this issue further in chapter 6.3.6 and 7. 
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The opportunity cost of avoided deforestation (on the basis of this 
scenario) was estimated byMcKinsey to be $580 million per year. This 
“offer”, which many considered to be an ecological form of 
blackmail, had no takers, but Guyana has Norway's commitment to 
pay up to $250 million for implementation of policies and measures to 
conserve forests, provided that the national deforestation rate does 
not exceed 0.275% per year — leaving the country some leeway given 
the current (lower) rate (Karsenty and Ongolo 2011:42) 
This baseline scenario was referred to by many of my informants. KOS did not 
buy the McKinsey scenario; they looked at it as “illustrative but totally 
unrealistic” (interview, Pharo). Rather than adopting the scenario developed by 
McKinsey, deforestation reference levels were developed based both on the 
historical deforestation levels in Guyana and the global reference level. These 
levels give Guyana leeway to actually increase its deforestation rate, given the 
historically extremely low rates. But if the deforestation increases beyond 0.05 
percent a mechanism is in place that gradually decreases the estimated 
payments.
22
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
22 See the Joint Concept Note for more detailed information on the incentive structure: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/MD/2011/vedlegg/klima/klima_skogprosjektet/Guyana/JointConceptN
ote_31mars2011.pdf (Accessed 06.11.12) 
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6.1.3 Government networks 
“(…) More evanescent are the individual actors who can emerge from 
almost anywhere, with an impact of unpredictable nature and 
duration. Who would have said that Princess Diana would have 
become a crusader against land mines, causing controversy inside her 
own state on a matter of defense policy?” (Hill 2003:224). 
 
And who would have thought that her former husband, Prince Charles, would 
have anything to do with the Norway-Guyana REDD partnership? 
In fact, Prince Charles was no less than “instrumental in bringing forest countries 
together” (interview, Nokta) and provided an arena for key actors from Norway 
and Guyana
23
 to meet. According to Anne Marie Slaughter, the main source of 
policy decisions is to be found in the range of conferences and meeting places 
that together comprise what she calls “the new world order.” One of these arenas 
that facilitated contact between Minister Solheim and President Jagdeo is the 
Prince’s Rainforest Project.24  
Through this project, Prince Charles hosted a meeting in April 2009 inviting 
world leaders to St James’s Palace to raise awareness of the tropical deforestation 
and the need for emergency action to halt it. Prime Minister Stoltenberg and 
Guyana’s Prime Minister Samuel Hind were among the officials who attended 
the meeting. The Prince had a special connection to Guyana, being the Royal 
Patron of the Guyanese nature conservation project called Iwokrama.  According 
to Steven Grin, Guyana’s GRIF advisor, “Prince Charles was a kick-starter, a 
facilitator of the Guyana-Norway relationship” (interview, Grin). Prime Minister 
                                              
23 Informants have differed in their account of who actually met through the project. Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg, Minister Solheim, President Jagdeo, and Prime Minister Hind have all been mentioned. 
24 According to the website “the Project’s work was largely concluded in Oslo in May 2010 when over 
fifty Governments launched the R.E.D.D.+ Partnership..” I have not succeeded in establishing contact 
with The Prince’s Rainforest Project, but information about the project can be found here: 
http://www.rainforestsos.org/ 
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Stoltenberg has also mentioned Prince Charles’ important role in the work to 
reduce deforestation. At the Oslo Climate Conference on May 27, 2010, 
Stoltenberg invited Prince Charles to hold the opening speech and he was given 
the credit for having brought several countries’ leaders together to form forest 
partnerships. At this occasion, HRH The Prince of Wales said in his keynote 
speech: 
I have endeavored to create a global public, private and NGO 
partnership to discover an innovative means of halting tropical 
deforestation. Success would literally transform the situation for our 
children and grandchildren and for every species on the planet. 
Failure, I’m afraid, is inconceivable 
- HRH The Prince of Wales (2010). 
 
6.1.4 Jagdeo: Champion of the earth I 
My informants have all pointed to the pivotal role of Guyana’s former President, 
Bharrat Jagdeo. He was highly vocal on the international scene, representing a 
strong voice from the tropical South. He was very influential in focusing on the 
countries that have not yet started deforesting, and the importance of creating 
incentives also for them, and not only for countries that already have high 
deforestation rates.  In 2010 he won the UN Champion of the Earth prize and is 
today “Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins” (Amazon, Congo Basin, and 
South East Asia). In March 2012, the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) announced that he would become the IUCN High Level Envoy 
for Sustainable Development in Forest Countries and Patron of Nature. 
 
Power in Guyana lies in the office of the president (interviews, Liang, Patel, 
anonymous). The ministries have little power, and most decisions are made by 
the President himself or his close allies. The initiative of the LCDS is seen as 
President Jagdeo’s own and not an initiative by Guyana as a country. One 
informant characterizes the former Guyanese President as an extremely powerful, 
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dynamic, and charismatic leader. He is very well-connected, having been both 
Minister of Finance and then President for two terms, which is the maximum 
according to Guyanese constitution.  He was thus a man to open doors, and to 
close them immediately if he wished. According to the informant, he could also 
be dogmatic, determined and aggressive and outright angry if he did not get his 
way (interview, anonymous). 
That anger has been felt most heavily by the World Bank, which has felt 
Jagdeo’s discontent throughout the partnership.25 But Stoltenberg, too, became 
the subject of Jagdeo’s anger when he candidly said at a panel with Stoltenberg 
during the COP-16 in Cancun in 2010 how the money from Norway was not 
coming even though Guyana had met the conditions. The Guardian quotes 
Jagdeo saying: “It’s a nightmare. It is a test of the sincerity of the developed 
world, and the delivery on development assistance has been abysmal” and “We 
have not seen a single cent expended as yet on the projects that are so vital to 
transformation” (Jagdeo, cited in The Guardian, 2010). Such comments did not 
help in showcasing the partnership as a model for the world. The Guardian 
reported: “There was a burst of applause. Stoltenberg, who had been staring hard 
at Jagdeo during his speech, did not join in” (The Guardian 2010). 
 
But Jagdeo’s role as a visionary leader with political will to make a model for 
rainforest countries is what makes him a central actor in my analysis. His voice 
was very strong in the international arena. Like Solheim, he has been granted the 
prize “Champion of the Earth,” awarded by the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP).  Solheim calls him “a very positive and active president” 
who was eager to place Guyana on the international arena and personally 
concerned about climate change: “He invoked confidence, there was no doubt 
that he meant what he said” (interview, Solheim). One informant described him 
saying “Jagdeo is a good salesman” (interview, Ram). Most of the informants 
                                              
25  I refer to the relationship between Jagdeo and the World Bank in chapter 5.2.1, “A hands-off 
approach..” 
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pointed to President Jagdeo as the main reason for why Guyana was chosen. One 
informant said:  
 
“It’s a mystery why we chose Guyana. I guess Jagdeo is to blame, or 
has the honor, for that. Minister Solheim and Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg were eager to make NICFI work fast. They wanted to 
show that we actually did something and to build this new paradigm” 
(interview, anonymous).  
 
The idea was that with the eager president in Guyana results could come quickly, 
and, as I will develop further in section 6.3, that was precisely what Norway 
needed.  
6.1.5 Concluding remarks 
In this section I have examined the international factors that contributed to the 
Norway-Guyana partnership. In an examination of the international, the context 
of global climate change becomes important. A large-scale climate initiative 
would not have gained momentum had the understanding of global climate 
change been absent. Thus, several strong contributions that showed the 
seriousness of climate change comprised an important backdrop of NICFI. This 
perception of the seriousness of climate change, combined with the economic 
logic of PES, made REDD an appealing option. There is no reason to doubt that 
this resonated well with the economist Prime Minister Stoltenberg. To 
understand the Guyana decision in particular, one must in addition bring into the 
analysis the government networks that facilitated contact between Norway and 
Guyana. But the international level is not exclusively about structures. It has also 
proved fruitful to be “actor-specific” as FPA advocates.  Chapter 6.1.4 shows 
how former president of Guyana, Jagdeo, played a crucial part. Jagdeo and his 
political power are principal reasons why Norway chose Guyana. Following my 
analysis framework, I will next proceed to what domestic factors can explain the 
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partnership. As outlined in chapter 3, I conceptualize the domestic level 
comprising of the four Ps: the press, public opinion, parliament, and pressure 
groups. 
6.2 Domestic explanations: The four Ps 
6.2.1 Press and other media 
It is not difficult to see how media can exert influence when covering wars or 
famines.  Guyana, however, is not a country that looms high the Norwegian 
public, to put it mildly. There has been very little media coverage of Guyana, 
either before and after it became Norway’s second largest bilateral REDD 
recipient. When searching for the words “Guyana” and “rainforest” in the press 
in the Norwegian media monitor Retriever, relatively few articles come up, as 
seen in figure four:
26
  
 
 
Figure 4 Guyana and its rainforest in Norwegian printed media  
Source: Media search at retriver.no 
                                              
26 All searches have been done in http://retriever.no/, accessed 10.11.12. Retriever is Scandinavia’s 
largest media monitor. For simplicity I have only included printed media. All searches are meant to be 
illustrative. A thorough media analysis is outside of the scope of this thesis. 
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The figure shows the prevalence of the word Guyana combined with rainforest in 
Norwegian printed media. Taking into consideration that the search includes 110 
printed newspapers and that articles that only mention Guyana without the 
country being its main focus are also included, the numbers seen in figure four 
must be considered very low. In 2006 there is a top with 11 articles mentioned 
Guyana and the rainforest, with articles on logging, Amerindian tribes, and 
governance challenges. These articles are all published in local newspapers, 
however. After that, very few articles mention Guyana until the signing of the 
MoU in November 2009.  17 out of the 21 articles that mention Guyana during 
2009 were published during November and December, which means that 
preceding the signing of the MoU, the press kept quiet about this small, tropical 
country.  
Also in comparison with the other bilateral REDD countries, the picture is clear: 
in relation to rainforests, Guyana is mentioned in a total of 106 times in the 
printed press, whereas Indonesia and Brazil is mentioned 656 times and 1222 
times respectively. The lack of media coverage is an indication that the press 
cannot be said to have influenced the decision of electing Guyana as a partner 
country. Also the critical articles about Guyana are quite few; among them is the 
Christian newspaper Vårt land with a publication questioning the Amaila Falls 
project and the independent monthly publication Development Today, which is 
mostly read by development professionals. Development Today has a special 
section on the Norway-Guyana Partnership and has written seven articles on the 
topic so far.
27
  
Searching for “deforestation” and “climate change” adds to the picture of the 
media’s role in relation to NICFI. The result can be seen in figure five on the 
next page:  
                                              
27 Development Today series on Norway-Guyana available at: http://www.development-
today.com/norway-guyana_forest_deal Accessed 27.10.12. One could argue that the readers of 
Development Today represent examples of what Hill calls the “attentive public” who may affect foreign 
policy (Hill 2003: 262). But it is difficult to trace an influence on policy stemming from these articles. 
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Figure 5 Climate change and deforestation in Norwegian printed media 
Source: Media search at retriever.no 
The graph shows the historical prevalence of the words “climate change” (in 
blue) and “deforestation” (in yellow). Both search words shows a stark increase 
from 2006 to 2007, indicating a markedly heightened focus on these issues. This 
matches the time when the Stern review and IPPCC report were published as 
explained in section 6.1.1, and is a further indication on the overall focus that 
was given to these issues. The media thus may to some extent be a factor for 
climate action but seems like a poor explanation for NICFI in general and the 
Guyana partnership in particular. 
Irene Øvstebø Tvedten argues that NICFI has become depoliticized and that 
decisions are taken concealed from the general public (Tvedten 2011). 
Controversies and issues within NICFI are viewed as technical and not political. 
This depoliticization can explain the lack of media coverage about NICFI and 
about deciding on specific partner countries. So then, what about the public 
opinion? 
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6.2.2 Public opinion 
According to Hill, there is a widespread ignorance among the general public 
about the details of foreign affairs (Hill 2003:263). This seems to be true also 
with regards to foreign aid, which became apparent in a poll issued by Norad 
(Norad 2012). Only one percent knew which country received the most aid 
funding,
28
 and only 34 percent of the population say they are interested in 
Norwegian foreign aid. To put it bluntly, the majority of the Norwegian public 
cares little about knowing how the 28 billion NOK spent annually on the foreign 
aid budget is used. However, 60 percent think Norway has an obligation to give 
aid and 65 percent think international development is beneficial for Norway as 
well. Thus the giving of aid receives support, whereas the details remain 
uninteresting to most. 
This public support to Norwegian aid-spending can be seen in light of Terje 
Tvedt’s notion of the ‘Do-gooder Regime’(Tvedt 2007:621). As constructivist 
FPA directs attention to, a state’s aid allocation is deeply rooted in a state’s 
national culture. Canada is an example of a country whose national identity is 
inclined toward positive international action (Barnett 2008:194). Norway is 
another such country (Tvedt 2007). According to Tvedt, this national identity has 
developed into what he calls a national “Do-gooder Regime.” This notion refers 
to the unique standing and legitimacy of the field of international development 
and foreign aid in Norway; in fact, the whole nation supports it, according to 
Tvedt (2007:621). This broad consensus makes it possible to dramatically change 
the content of development policies without waking public debate. The aid 
budget is described as a measure of the nation’s ability to care, and thus becomes 
a “thermometer of the country’s moral status” (Tvedt 2007:629). 
In this light, public opinion seem to give support for spending aid in general, but 
there seems to be little explanation value for the Guyana decision in particular. 
                                              
28 Which was Brazil in 2010 and 2011 because of REDD funding from NICFI. 
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Neither the media nor public opinion was a driver, but on the other hand there 
has been little protest, so neither of the two can be said to have posed constraints 
either. 
6.2.3 Parliament 
NICFI has broad support in the Parliament from all parties except the Progress 
Party. The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) has been the watchdog in 
Parliament, following different aspects of the initiative. According to Hill, FACs 
rarely exert strong influence on a country’s foreign policy. That becomes 
apparent from the “relatively infrequent plenary debates on foreign affairs” in the 
national assembly, where “only a small proportion of members is informed and 
interested about foreign affairs” (Hill 2003:257). 
Still, it is the FACs that have the opportunity to function as watchdogs and 
quality controllers (Hill 2003:257).  In Norway, the FAC is comprised of 
members from the seven main political parties. In the FAC’s recommendation on 
the White Paper Climate, Conflict and Capital, several important aspects 
concerning NICFI are highlighted. The committee affirmed that they supported 
the initiative holding that it is “a strategic follow-up on the Climate Settlement to 
tackle climate change, and that the fight against deforestation is intrinsically 
attached to poverty alleviation and sustainable economic development” (FAC 
2008:24). They do, however, express criticism about the financing. The 
committee suggest a new post on the National Budget called “Financing of 
Global Common Goods.” Where development and poverty alleviation is not the 
main purpose, the financing should be kept outside of the aid budget (FAC 
2008:25). If not, the committee warns that we will see a diffusing of what can be 
labelled aid, and that climate measures can become at the expense of the fight 
against poverty (FAC 2008:26). 
In FAC’s recommendation to the 2012 national budget, Guyana is specifically 
addressed. In this recommendation the general support of NICFI is again 
highlighted, although the members from the Conservative Party and the 
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Norwegian Christian Democratic Party note the high risks in parts of NICFI and 
asks how the Government ensures that the large payments in fact give the 
intended effects (FAC 2011:65). The members from the Progress Party “note a 
considerable pressure for REDD+ payments in general and for Guyana in 
particular.” These members accuse the government for expressing that it is “more 
important that the aid flow continues than that it gives results” (FAC 2011:64, 
my translation). 
There is no evidence of the Parliament or the FAC having actively supported the 
Guyana decision. Importantly, the Parliament was behind NICFI as a whole, but 
when it comes to Guyana there seems to have been expressed skepticism if 
anything.  It seems thus that the Parliament, like the press and public opinion, 
cannot explain the Guyana decision. If anything, Parliament discouraged it. 
6.2.4 Pressure groups 
The point of departure was the Climate settlement from 2007. At that 
point I had just become Development Minister and the government 
had put forward a climate bill that was being criticized for not being 
strong enough. It was very criticized by the opposition. So we were 
looking for something new to do, and then came the suggestion from 
Lars and Lars that Norway should set aside a substantial amount of 
money to save the rainforest. It was possible exclusively because 
Norway was in that situation (interview, Solheim).
29
 
 
The leader of Norway’s rainforest Foundation Lars Løvold and the Chairman of 
Friends of the Earth Norway Lars Haltbrekken were the ones who proposed the 
                                              
29  My translation. Original quotation: “Utgangspunktet var Stortingets klimaforlik fra 2007. Da var jeg 
akkurat blitt utviklingsminister og regjeringen hadde lagt fram en Klimamelding som jo var veldig 
kritisert for ikke å være god nok. Den ble veldig kritisert av opposisjonen. Så vi var ute etter noe nytt å 
gjøre, og så kom det forslag fra Lars Løvold og Lars Haltbrekken (..) om at Norge skulle sette av en god 
slump penger til å redde regnskog. Det var mulig utelukkende fordi NNorge var i den situasjonen..”  
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idea of a large-scale climate and forest initiative, in the letter that became known 
as “The Letter from Lars & Lars.” 
 “Well, you need someone with an idea, Lars and Lars, and someone to carry it 
through, me” (interview, Solheim).30 Even though they have been credited for 
being the idea-makers behind NICFI, civil society groups did not play an 
important role when it came to the selection of Guyana. RFN had projects in 
many other Amazon states, but not Guyana. In an article in Development Today 
published September 9, 2012, Lars Løvold says Norway should have chosen the 
Congo Basin instead of Guyana, as the forests of the former are of such an 
important size (Development Today 2012). RFN is by far the most important 
pressure group in the context, and it is clear that they did not advocate 
specifically for Guyana (interview, Olsen). 
6.2.5 Concluding remarks 
In this section I have shown domestic factors that did and did not contribute to 
the decision of Guyana as REDD partner country. When reviewing the media 
coverage on Guyana it becomes clear that the press provides a poor explanation 
for the choice of Guyana. There seem to be no ground for advocacy for Guyana 
in Norwegian media; rather, the coverage about the country reflects the minimal 
interest it has in Norwegian public. Public opinion, too, provides little 
explanation for the Guyana decision. It did not influence the choice, and it did 
not put constraints on the decision-makers. The general public is little involved 
and interested in Norwegian aid, but as Tvedt argues, the country’s self-
understanding is that of an “humanitarian super power,” which is also reflected in 
the poll stating that 60 percent are of the opinion that Norway has an obligation 
to give aid.  
                                              
30 My translation. Original quotation: “Altså du må ha noen som kommer med ideen, Lars og Lars, og 
noen som driver den igjennom, meg” 
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The Parliament supported NICFI, but the FAC did express concerns about 
Guyana due to the lack of Norwegian experience and presence. The explanation 
is therefore not to be found in the pressure groups either, as no NGO or other 
pressure group advocated for Guyana. It thus seems that, although the domestic 
political level was important to provide the necessary support for NICFI, it did 
not influence the decision to support Guyana specifically, which is my main 
research focus. To answer the question why Norway chose a REDD partnership 
with Guyana, one has to look more closely at the actual decision-makers and 
their views and perceptions. This will be done in the following section. 
6.3 Governmental politics 
This part relies most heavily on Allison’s Organizational and Bureaucratic 
Politics Model, described in section 3.3. In this section I look more closely at the 
specific actors that decided to elect Guyana for REDD partnership. This section 
relies more heavily on interviews than the previous ones, as I here give an 
account for my understanding of the perceptions of the key actors. 
 
6.3.1 Who plays? 
First, who were the main actors in Norway that chose Guyana? As the actor-
specific framework FPA underscores, an analysis of foreign policy must include 
the relevant actors and departmental groups in their analysis. In this case, three 
institutions are worth mentioning: MFA, ME, and Norad. These are the three 
institutions that have responsibilities in NICFI. As we will see, the perceptions 
and priorities differ greatly in these institutions. But let us first discuss two 
central actors; Prime Minister Stoltenberg and the former Minister for 
International Development and the Environment, Erik Solheim. 
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6.3.2 Prime Minister Stoltenberg 
As Hill (2003) argues, identifying who holds formal power is one of the tasks of 
a foreign policy analyst. In a book chapter titled “The Prime Minister’s office — 
the smallest, but the most powerful?” Nils Morten Udgaard shows how the 
influence of the PMO in Norway has changed over time (Udgaard 2006). The 
role is usually a coordinating one, rather than a catalyzing one. But the PMO can 
become very important in those cases where the Prime Minister engages directly 
and personally (Udgaard 2006:52). That has been the case with REDD. 
Stoltenberg surprised even his closest colleagues when he announced three 
billion NOK to be spent annually on preserving the rainforest, in Cancun in 2007. 
He thus put his name and political prestige behind the REDD billions. 
According to some informants, there was pressure from PMO to make things 
happen fast. The political advisor at the time, Kjetil Lund, has also been 
described as very influential. He is also part of the board of the Green Fund and 
has experience with CDM. According to some informants, PMO was eager to get 
results fast and pushed KOS to deliver results. It has been difficult to assess the 
influence by PMO, and the opinions of my informants have varied on the issue. 
The next key actor discussed, Minister for International Development and the 
Environment Solheim, said that Prime Minister Stoltenberg was important in that 
he decided to opt for NICFI, but when it came to the Guyana decision, he let 
Solheim decide for himself without influencing. 
6.3.3 Solheim: Champion of the Earth II 
In his letter to Minister Solheim when leaving office, President Jagdeo states: 
“Your personal dedication has been a major reason why we have travelled this 
far” (Jagdeo: 2011). There is no reason to think otherwise. The two Champion of 
the Earth award winners respected each other and are without doubt a major 
reason why the partnership happened. Solheim has been especially engaged in 
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the Guyana partnership and calls it the project that is closest to his heart.
31
 He 
says, “What is unique is that the forest is close to intact. It is a fascinating 
country, and it’s funny that it’s a country that previously was only known for the 
Jonestown massacre, it was a typical fly-over country. It has meant a lot to 
Guyana finally being at center stage” (interview, Solheim).32  
Guyana is in fact the only country that was completely the decision of ME and 
has become a symbol case for KOS (interview, anonymous). Historically, in 
2007 it was the first time Norway’s Minister for International Development and 
Minister for the Environment was combined and made into one “Super minister,” 
as it was called in the press. This institutional detail got attention throughout the 
world, and was by most of my informants looked upon as modern, and a logical 
follow-up of the term sustainable development. 
When asked about the importance of the fact that the two areas belonged to one 
minister, Solheim answered: “It would not have been possible had that not been 
the case. That is because the policy to such a large degree was in ME while the 
money was in the MFA. No one ever gets a minister to give money to another 
ministry. We would never have get started had I not been in charge of both, that 
is absolutely certain” (interview, Solheim).33  The importance of this institutional 
set-up is confirmed by my other informants, such as Pharo: “It was certainly an 
advantage that Solheim was Minister both for international development and the 
environment” (interview, Pharo).34 There is no reason to underestimate this 
                                              
31 My translation. The Norwegian word is “hjertesak”, which does not have a straight-forward direct 
translation to English. 
32 My translation. Original quotation: “Det enestående er at skogen er nær intakt. Det er et fascinerende 
land, morsomt med et land som det eneste det var kjent for var massakren i Jonestown, det var et 
typisk ”Fly-over country.” Det har betydd mye for Guyana endelig å være i sentrum.” 
33 My translation. Original quotation: ”Det hadde vært helt umulig å få gjennom hvis ikke det hadde vært 
tilfelle. Det skyldes at politikken i så stor grad lå i MD mens pengene lå i UD. Ingen får noen minister til 
å gi pengene til et annet departement. Vi hadde aldri kommet i gang hvis ikke jeg hadde hatt begge deler, 
det er helt sikkert.” 
34 My translation. Original quotation: ”Det var helt sikkert en fordel at Solheim var både utviklings- og 
miljøminister.” 
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bureaucratic detail. Having one minister responsible for both international 
development and the environment, the bureaucratic setting was in place to 
facilitate a holistic approach with the coupling of aid and the environment.  
 Even though Solheim was officially in charge of both the environment with 
bureaucrats in ME and development, with bureaucrats in the MFA, he was much 
more aligned with the environmental side. One informant who attended meetings 
in Guyana had the impression that the Minister did not listen to the aid side in the 
Ministry, but was only getting advice from and was aligned with the 
environmental side (interview, anonymous). Other anonymous informants also 
confirm this view. 
In Guyana, Solheim’s sudden departure from office35 caused alarm, according to 
one informant. Some of the informants in Guyana even expressed a worry that 
NICFI might end, as there were now two ministries instead of one. Their fear is 
not necessarily based solely on the fact of Minister Solheim having the two 
responsibilities, but also that he was perceived as so positive towards the Guyana 
partnership. He had been seen as extremely positive towards the partnership and 
a personal friend of Jagdeo (interview, anonymous).  As seen, Solheim was a key 
actor. I will now look closer at the definition of the situation, as perceived by 
Solheim and KOS. 
6.3.4 ‘The definition of the situation’ 
As Snyder et al. notes (1954) a country’s foreign policy is shaped by how key 
actors perceive the reality. What is the situation at hand? In this section, I will 
account for what Snyder et al. (1954) termed ‘the definition of the situation’ as 
interpreted through my interviews with the main actors involved in choosing 
Guyana (that is to say, Minister Solheim and KOS). According to Solheim, the 
decision was made by himself and the leaders of KOS in ME. 
                                              
35 In March 2012 Solheim had to leave office and the development and the environment were again 
turned into two separate minister postings. The departure, which was against Solheim’s own will, is seen 
as a result of internal workings in the socialist left party. 
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Quickly before Copenhagen! 
In my interviews of ME employees, all have highlighted the importance of how 
they defined the situation at the time of entering in agreement with Guyana. 
Central was the belief in an internationally binding agreement in Copenhagen 
that would include forestry. Norway had to show, with real-world examples, that 
REDD was working. 
“The prevailing world view in climate policy circles was that in Copenhagen we 
would agree on a climate deal that would include forestry in the climate regime 
after 2013. To support that process, things had to happen quickly, and that 
demanded political leadership at the highest levels in our partner countries.” 
(interview, Pharo). 
In other words, the MoU signed on November 9, 2009 was a last-minute call, 
only one month before the UNFCCC COP-15 in Copenhagen.  “They were aware 
of the risks, but under very political pressure from Oslo. They had to do it 
quickly. And I think they wanted to get it signed before Copenhagen so they did 
what they could but I think in the end they just had to do it quickly” (interview, 
anonymous). 
In the same line of reasoning is the notion that the money was put on the table 
and the policies outlined afterwards. As Minister Solheim said: “The money and 
the ideas came first, then we had to find out how to do this practically” (Solheim, 
interview). Repeatedly in my interviews the rhetorical question was asked: 
Should we wait until all the mechanisms were in place and then go ahead with 
the partnership? No, we wanted to make things happen, and learn by doing. “We 
must not let the perfect become the enemy of the good” seems to be a mantra that 
reflects the understanding in KOS. Solheim put it like this in the joint press 
release following the signing of the MoU: “We are giving the world a workable 
model for climate change collaboration between North and South. It’s not 
perfect, but it’s good, and it will be improved upon as we learn and develop 
together” (ME 2009). 
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Financing NICFI from the aid budget was also “ok, but not perfect.”  The aid 
budget was simply the only place they could get the money. This is because the 
government wanted to achieve the goal of spending 1 percent of the national 
budget on aid. The three billion NOK would contribute to this goal being 
reached, whereas keeping it outside of the aid-budget would demand a “re-
prioritizing of a completely different scale” (interview, Pharo).  Minister Solheim 
on his side could well have kept it outside of the aid budget:  
I believe that the rich countries have filled the atmosphere with CO2, 
we have a debt to pay and that we could well pay outside of the aid 
budget. But if you insist on having it hundred percent your way every 
time, you never manage to get anything done (interview, Solheim).
36  
In light of this, the fact that the money is development aid seems the result of a 
necessity.  
The seriousness of climate change 
Another and related feature was the strong understanding of the seriousness of 
climate change. With that in mind, it became crucial to make things happen in a 
sector that stood for about a fifth of greenhouse gas emissions.  
“The situation of the international negotiations and the seriousness that the IPCC-
report made clear meant that we were actively seeking large-scale solutions. The 
climate debate as a whole contributed to the possibility of an ambitious project 
like this” (interview, Tveteraas). 
Phrases like “this is Norway’s possibility to help avoid the catastrophe” show the 
importance attached to REDD and NICFI. The initiative is first and foremost a 
climate initiative, as a result of the understanding of the seriousness of climate 
                                              
36 My translation. Original quotation: “Jeg mener at vi de rike landene har fylt opp atmosfæren med en 
CO2, vi har en gjeld å betale, den kan vi godt betale utenfor bistandsbudsjettet. Men hvis du insisterer på 
å få det hundre prosent som du vil hver gang, så får du aldri til noe.”  
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change that demanded solutions that could potentially create large emission 
reductions. 
A new type of aid 
The understanding is also that new power dynamics demands new types of aid. 
There are increasingly assertive countries in the world that no longer want aid 
with strings attached, with the donor country deciding on the use of the aid 
money. With new donors such as China and Brazil that demand less from aid 
recipients, the recipient countries have more to choose from and do not 
necessarily want aid from Western countries that tell them what to do. The West 
is losing its dominance, and that is true also in the world of aid. According to 
Solheim, there is an “unbelievable arrogance in thinking that we know best” 
(interview, Solheim). According to Minister Solheim, NICFI represents this new 
type of aid that has taken this new multipolar worldview into account. This new 
aid is characterized by more flexibility and a larger space for action for the 
recipient.  
A parallel can be drawn to the work of Eirik Jansen. Also he notes a conflict 
between future-oriented work versus detailed checking of financial standards.  
When one is supposed to think of the big picture with regard to the 
environment and natural resources, it may easily seem too petty to 
check the details of financial accounts and grass root activities. This 
will be defined as the domain of the authorities, and according to the 
principle of recipient responsibility we must have confidence in their 
reports. Such attitudes seem to arise when the focus is on the overall, 
future-orientated work (Jansen 2009:20).  
The quote is taken from Eirik G. Jansen’s paper “Does aid work?” as part of the 
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. He evaluates what went wrong in a 
Norwegian forestry program in Tanzania, where extensive corruption was 
revealed. There have been no such revelations in the Guyana case, and Solheim 
says that Norway is to keep a zero-tolerance for corruption. I still find there to be 
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a parallel. In both cases the petty nitty-gritties are opposing the more visionary 
future-orientated work on the environment and forestry. 
 
6.3.5 Another perspective 
“It was a very strange country to choose, there is no one here that knows Guyana. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we were skeptical, mostly for practical reasons, 
we had no presence there.” The quotation is from an informant in the MFA who 
has worked with and followed the Guyana partnership. All of the informants in 
the MFA agree that it was a problematic country, and their description differs 
greatly from the understanding described above, some even calling the choice 
“stupid.” There seem to be two different lines of thought that become apparent 
through the partnership with Guyana.  The view in the ME is that REDD is 
something new and important, that demands a higher level of risk-taking than 
regular aid. In the MFA, on the other hand, the concern is that what has been 
learned through four decades of aid giving is undermined. The differences are 
exaggerated by the fact that ME is responsible for the political decisions 
regarding the REDD partnerships within NICFI, whereas MFA is responsible for 
the actual spending and for ensuring that the developmental goals are achieved. 
Bad aid 
This partnership, one informant said, is outright “bad aid.” “Guyana says no, we 
want to decide for ourselves. Why? Guyana is among the most corrupt countries 
in the world. Jagdeo was steering it like his own farm. They don’t even have a 
law for public procurements!” (interview, anonymous). A few of the informants 
mentioned that it is problematic how Norway is speaking with two voices. 
We have developed routines, management practices, and regulations 
through years in relation to the Storting and the Auditor General. We’re 
supposed to keep a zero-tolerance when it comes to corruption. Norway has 
helped build safeguards in IDB, UNDP, and the World Bank. We have 
demanded it, as we are in the boards (interview, anonymous).  
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The dilemma is that Norway is speaking with two voices, according to some of 
my informants. On the one hand, Norway has been an advocate for strong 
safeguards in the World Bank, and now through this partnership it is seeking to 
avoid these same safeguards. This was referred to in several interviews as a 
problematic issue. An example is found in the MFA decision document 
concerning the making of an agreement with the World Bank. Here the MFA 
refers to a memo from ME, where ME recommends that Norway ask the World 
Bank either to consider a new mechanism, or change the existing mechanism in 
order to meet Guyana’s needs. In this regard, MFA warned against asking the 
World Bank to deviate from its standard operational policies concerning 
assessments of cost effectiveness and development effect. But the request is 
made, and the World Bank’s reply is that it is not an option to make changes to 
any of the World Bank’s operational policies (MFA 2010). Such examples put 
Norway in a bad light, according to the same informants. 
According to Solheim, MFA showed their skepticism towards Guyana from the 
very beginning. But when asked who decided on Guyana, the answer was clear: 
“The forest guys37 and I decided that. If we’d said no, there would have been no 
partnership, but since we said yes, there was. Nobody else interfered with that” 
(interview, Solheim).
38
 The skepticism from the MFA was noted, but did not 
prevent approval from being given. 
But skepticism was also expressed elsewhere. Other donors had meetings with 
the Norwegian delegations when they visited Guyana in March 2010. The 
delegation was warned that Guyana was a difficult country with serious problems 
when it comes to corruption and public procurements. One informant says that 
                                              
37 In Norwegian, the expression forest people or ”skogfolkene” is used for the people working in NICFI, 
which is also called the forest-initiative for short. 
38 My translation. Original quotation: ”Skogfolkene og jeg bestemte det. Hadde vi sagt nei, hadde det 
ikke blitt noe, men siden vi sa ja så ble det. Det var ingen andre som blandet seg opp i det..” 
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Norway was quite naïve and had done too little assessment of political risks and 
context in Guyana (interview, anonymous). The fact that Norway did not have 
anyone on the ground in Guyana was questioned and criticized by this and 
several other informants. 
The government of Guyana’s key advisor said that the communication with the 
two ministries has not always been easy: “There are two very different matters of 
opinion in the two ministries. The dialogue was always good with Solheim.  Now 
with the two ministers it’s going to get even more complicated. I believe Norway 
must have one agency and one minister that is responsible” (interview, Grin). 
Several informants in Guyana note a difference of opinion in the two ministries.  
Responsibility without influence 
The different opinions in MFA and ME are manifested in the MFA decision 
document concerning the agreement with the World Bank to establish GRIF 
(MFA 2010). This document is one of those I was given access to through the 
online official archive and provided a very interesting addition to my interviews. 
The document states that “KOS does not share all considerations in the note 
itself,” and where KOS disagrees this is explicitly stated. One example concerns 
the negotiations with Guyana about the financial mechanism of the GRIF. In one 
paragraph, these are characterized as difficult and time consuming, largely 
because the Guyanese side repeatedly says that the funding is considered as PES 
and that it should not be regarded as development aid. In the document it is noted 
that KOS wishes to omit the paragraph “both because it is superfluous and 
because the rendering can at best be characterized as incomplete.” MFA on the 
other hand “thinks that this demonstrates a key point in the discussions with 
Guyana and the Climate- and Forest Initiative in general” (MFA 2010, my 
translation). 
The different perspectives can to some degree be traced to the fact that the ME 
and the MFA have different areas of responsibility. Minister Solheim states that 
the different attitudes in the ME and in MFA are due to the organization and not 
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inherent differences between the two departments. “Usually the MFA is just as 
risk-willing as the ME. The explanation is more of a human one, that it is ME 
that has driven this through while the MFA has been on the sideline. Then they 
get very nervous, fearsome and a bit jealous” (interview, Solheim).39 This is 
parallel to the notion of roles and how bureaucrats and other professionals get 
socialized into certain attitudes. Remembering Hill’s description of bureaucracies 
as typically risk-averse, systematic, and conservative, the description fits better in 
the case of the MFA bureaucrats than the ME bureaucrats.  
That might, as Minister Solheim said in my interview, not be because the two 
departments view risk differently, but because they have different responsibilities 
(interview, Solheim). The ME is responsible for making REDD work politically, 
and must therefore be concerned with getting fast and visible results:  that is, to 
put it bluntly, to make large payments quickly. The MFA, on the other hand, is 
responsible for the actual use of this money, and it is therefore natural that they 
be more skeptical and risk-averse. But not being politically responsible for the 
actual decisions means exerting little actual influence on how the money is used. 
This is an unsatisfactory combination, some informants pointed out. Being 
responsible, one would like to have the influence to decide.  
The problem becomes so visual in the Guyana case because it was a country 
chosen by ME with MFA’s objections being largely overruled. In that way, it can 
be seen as a symbol case of the interdepartmental disagreements in the forest 
initiative: “The Guyana case is very illustrative on the general disagreements on 
the forest initiative. It is a symbol case of the disagreements between MFA and 
ME, the different points of view become very clear” (interview, Trædal). 
                                              
39 My translation. Original quotation: “UD er som regel minst like risikovillig som MD. Det har heller en 
menneskelig forklaring, at det er MD som har drevet dette gjennom mens UD har sittet på sidelinja, Da 
blir de veldig nervøse og fryktsomme og litt sjalu.” 
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6.3.6 Norad and the risk assessment 
In September 2010 Norad finalized a risk report that points to high risks in the 
Guyana partnership.
40
 Norad is the directorate on development cooperation under 
the Norwegian MFA. Norad’s main task is to ensure the quality of Norway’s 
official development aid. As REDD is financed by ODA money, the REDD 
partnership with Guyana is one of the aid projects that are under Norad’s 
mandate for giving quality assurance and advice. But Norad’s role in deciding on 
Guyana has been modest. The fact that the risk report made by Norad was made 
almost a year after the partnership was signed shows that Norad had no “veto” 
power to stop the partnership. Even though risks were identified as high, the 
partnership was already initiated.  
The lack of influence can be seen in light of the fact that the formal responsibility 
for Norway’s development aid projects was moved from Norad to MFA in 2004 
(Tvedt 2007). Additionally, this observation further puts weight on the claim that 
the decision was politically steered, and that the risk report was a box to be 
ticked more than it was a report that might make a difference. One of the 
contributors to the risk report said it had exerted little influence. According to 
him, the risks identified in the report were secondary to the political aspects of 
the partnership: “It was such a prestige project; the Ministry of Environment 
wanted it to work no matter what” (interview, Trædal).  
6.1 Foreign aid, PES or foreign politics? 
Many of the disagreements that have become apparent throughout this research 
deal with the fact that the money allocated stems from the foreign aid budget, and 
is reported as ODA. But does that mean that it is aid? In my title, I do call the 
partnership aid, naming the thesis Aid in a rush. But at the same time, the 
partnership is understood as PES by most of my informants in Guyana. From this 
                                              
40 The risk assessment is also described in chapter 2.6. 
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perspective, the Norwegian funding is money earned as PES. “There are some 
parliamentarians in Norway who seem to feel that the tranches being paid from 
Norway to Guyana is development aid, as opposed to Payment for Ecosystem 
services provided by Guyana”(Interview, Major General Singh). Such comments 
were common during my interviews in Guyana. Also President Jagdeo was firm 
in stating that the partnership was not to be considered aid. In a speech to his 
nation in 2008, he outlines the strategies Guyana can take on to pursue a low-
carbon development. He states: “None of this is about countries like Guyana 
seeking aid – if anything, it is about rainforest countries assisting the developed 
world to solve a problem they mainly created” (Jagdeo 2008). This view was 
prevalent also among my ME informants.  
 
Even though the partnership may be perceived as PES, it is undeniably aid, at 
least in terms of source of funding. I also label the partnership aid in the title of 
this thesis. The informants in Norad and MFA tended to emphasize the fact that 
the money does in fact come from the aid budget. They note that the risks are 
high and that Norway has little contextual knowledge about Guyana. They 
emphasize the need to ensure that development aspects and financial standards 
attached to ODA funding are followed. This is difficult, as Guyana is a complex 
country without Norwegian presence. Even though the money is channeled 
through the World Bank, the partnership represents a problematic use of foreign 
aid. In a statement on global public goods (NUPI referred to in FAC 2008: 26) 
NUPI warns against opening up for other purposes for the aid budget than 
poverty reduction. Norway’s stand on this issue may, NUPI notes, “lead to 
changing the international standard on the line between foreign aid and climate 
commitments” (FAC 2008:26). 
 
In addition to representing both PES and aid, the partnership with Guyana can be 
seen as foreign policy. Through the partnership Norway wishes to demonstrate 
that REDD is working and through it inspire more donors to support the REDD 
regime. Some of my informants questioned Norway’s intentions behind the 
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partnership. One informant, the leader of Conservation International in Guyana, 
claims that the involvement from Norway was strong right before the 
international climate conferences in Cancun and Copenhagen, but that it has 
become more distant. For this informant Norway’s REDD involvement is about 
an oil-nation “going green”:   
 The agreements with Brazil, Indonesia and Guyana and substantial 
funding have put Norway on the map. It is no longer the country with 
huge reserves of fossil fuels, and one of the countries causing climate 
change; it has managed to green-wash, and has now walked away 
from its active engagements with the countries. That’s a view which I 
think it’s difficult to argue against (Interview, Singh). 
 
Another informant put it like this: “250 million USD over five years is not a big 
prize to pay to clean your conscience” (interview, Ram). Thus the REDD 
partnership with Guyana may be seen as official development aid, payment for 
environmental service and also foreign policy. But these different goals pull in 
different directions and create confusion both in Norway among government 
officials, and in the partner countries such as in Guyana.  
 
6.1.1 Concluding remarks 
In this last section I have shown that an actor-specific analysis at the 
governmental level is crucial to an understanding of the case. In performing this 
actor-specific analysis I have examined the main actors’ understanding and 
interpretation of reality: in Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s terms, “the definition of 
the situation” and how this definition has steered the actors to a course of action. 
I have shown that former Minister Solheim played a crucial role, and that he 
represents an important part of the answer to my research question. The 
bureaucratic set-up in which Solheim acted as minister for both international 
development and the environment, and the fact that Solheim engaged closely in 
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the Guyana partnership, make him an important explanatory (f)actor. Here we 
also see how the different factors are interlinked: for example, the two principal 
actors Minister Solheim and President Jagdeo are connected through government 
networks.  
I have also pointed to differences of perceptions and priorities between MFA and 
ME and how the partnership can be understood as foreign aid, PES and foreign 
policy at the same time. The differences identified are summarized in the 
simplified table: 
Table 2 Differing views of the partnership 
Views primarily expressed by 
ME/ KOS/ Solheim (Responsible for 
the politics of the REDD partnerships. 
Strong influence over decisions) 
Views primarily expressed by 
MFA/Norad (Responsible for the 
financial use of the REDD money and 
the development aspects. Exert less 
influence over decisions) 
Make progress fast, create models for 
the world, early action. There is 
political prestige in making large 
payments  
Warns against rushing, escalating of 
payments happening too fast 
Large payments is necessary to get 
international attention and is part of the 
strategy to fasten the process 
Large payments without apparatus to 
deal with it in the recipient country are 
problematic 
The poverty reduction is indirect, but 
REDD does leads to development, 
although indirectly, and it is ok to use 
the aid budget  
There should be clear demarcation of 
means that are primarily a climate 
measure and not development aid 
New challenges demand new thinking, 
Norway must be in front to ensure 
innovative financing models 
Build on experience and lessons 
learned from decades of aid 
administration 
Willing to take risks to establish a 
REDD regime. “MFA shows 
arrogance and an old-fashioned 
attitude when wanting detailed control 
of the use of money in the recipient 
countries” (interview, Solheim). 
Norway takes more risks with the 
NICFI means than what it does with 
other aid programs. That is not being 
clearly communicated, and is a 
problematic use of ODA. 
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7. Conclusion 
Through my analysis I have shown that an integrated account of international, 
domestic and governmental factors is necessary to understand why Norway 
entered into REDD partnership with Guyana. As the choice of Guyana is part of 
NICFI, the background for the initiative in general has also been dealt with in the 
analysis. My main focus has, however, been to understand why Norway chose 
Guyana as REDD partner country, in spite of the fact that Norway lacked 
experience with Guyana and that risks were identified as high. I have pointed to 
international, domestic and governmental factors that highlights why Guyana 
was chosen as REDD partner.  
 
The international factors of climate change awareness combined with an 
economic logic provide the backdrop which made NICFI possible. More 
importantly for the Guyana decision, I identify the government networks through 
which Guyanese and Norwegian actors could meet and interact. Here, Prince 
Charles plaid a role as a kick-starter and facilitator with his Rainforest Project 
and becomes an important explanatory factor to my research question. I have 
followed the actor-specific mantra of FPA and analyzed the importance of 
Guyana’s former President, Bharrat Jagdeo. He was a very important figure, 
whose strong standing on climate change at the international arena was one of the 
main reasons this partnership materialized. 
 
Among domestic factors I have analyzed how the four Ps of Press, Public 
opinion, Parliament and Pressure groups have or have not influenced the decision 
on Guyana. Interesting here is that the Press and Public opinion seem to have had 
very little awareness of Guyana and thus did not exert influence on the decision. 
Also the Parliament and the relevant Pressure groups did not exert pressure to 
make Norway choose Guyana. While they were important in pushing for NICFI 
as an initiative, they provide poor explanations for the decision of electing 
Guyana as Norway’s NICFI partner.  
 94 
Better explanation to my research question is found in the governmental factors, 
which is the last part of the three-fold analytical division. Here it becomes clear 
that the initiation of the Guyana partnership was an internal decision taken by 
Solheim and his close colleagues in KOS. I also examine how different 
departments had and still have very different perspectives on several aspects of 
the partnership. This became evident both through my interviews, and also, in a 
very marked way, in the decision document (MFA 2010) where ME and MFA 
make different comments and express different opinions on several issues.  
 
The traditional aid professionals argued against Guyana because of lack of 
Norwegian presence and knowledge about the country in addition to the 
challenges posed by corruption and fragile governance. Solheim and KOS on the 
other hand, looked at this not as traditional aid and thus had other priorities than 
standard development aid considerations. The fact that Guyana had a strong 
President with policies that matched KOS’ intentions became more important 
than traditional aid concerns. The partnership can be seen as a case of aid used 
primarily as a climate tool, and is in that way one example of the tendency of aid 
being used politically. This is also evident by the fact that the power to decide 
effectively laid not in the hands of the aid bureaucrats in MFA or Norad, but in 
the hands of KOS in ME.  
 
So then, why did Norway chose Guyana as a REDD partner? First, Norway did 
not choose Guyana as REDD partner. Solheim and his close allies did. They 
chose Guyana because they were looking to establish a partnership with a high 
forest-low deforestation country to provide a model for the world, a success story 
that would enhance REDD before the Climate meeting in Copenhagen. They 
were convinced by Jagdeo’s leadership and political will. Because of the set-up 
of NICFI, these climate-related concerns “won” over the aid-related risk and 
objections.  
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What new knowledge have I contributed with through this study? It is my 
opinion that this thesis offers a new and fruitful approach to the study of NICFI. 
Using the FPA approach has allowed me to dig deeper into the organizational 
and bureaucratic work and turf wars that surround the initiative. It also allowed 
me to analyze which international actors or networks facilitated the partnership. 
In addition focus on Guyana is unusual. This is a country that largely has steered 
away from public and scholarly attention. According to some of my informants, 
Guyana represents the epitome of the internal conflicts surrounding the initiative 
and thus it can provide a fruitful and concentrated case in point. The case shows 
how ME’s priorities triumphed over more traditional foreign aid concerns and 
that little time and a closed decision making characterized the process. The case 
was said to be a symbol case that in a marked way sums up, and challenges, the 
different priorities that NICFI represents. The partnership was definitely decided 
on in a rush, but whether it should be characterized as aid or not, remains open 
for discussion. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Interview overview 
Table 3 Complete list of informants 
Informant Affiliation Location Date 
Vemund Olsen RFN, observer to the GRIF Oslo 15.03.12 
Leif Tore Trædal Norad, Climate and forest 
evaluation, risk report co-author 
Oslo 06.03.12 
Eirik Jansen Norad Department of 
Governance and anti-corruption 
Oslo 06.03.12 
Anne Kristin 
Martinsen 
Norad, juridical department Oslo 08.03.12 
Tove Stub  ME, director KOS Guyana Oslo 12.04.12 
Marianne 
Johansen 
ME, KOS Guyana Oslo 12.04.12 
Marte Nordseth ME, former KOS Guyana, 
currently KOS Brazil 
Oslo 12.04.12 
Gjermund Sæther MFA, in charge of NICFI 
coordination 2009 
Oslo 27.04.12 
Per Mogstad MFA, in charge of NICFI 
coordination 2009-2011 
Oslo 03.05.12 
Erik Solheim Former Minister, International 
Development and Environment, 
MFA 
Oslo 10.05.12 
Andreas Tveteraas ME, KOS Oslo 15.05.12 
Alf Friisø MFA, department of Latin 
America 
Oslo 24.05.12 
Trygve Bendiksby MFA, department of multi-
lateral organizations 
Oslo 30.05.12 
Steven Grin Consultant, GOG/ GRIF New York 04.06.12 
David James Independent member of MSSC, 
attorney-at-law 
Georgetown 07.06.12 
Chris Ram Attorney-at-law, accountant and 
columnist 
Georgetown 11.06.12 
Shyam Nokta Adviser to the President and 
Head, Office of Climate change 
(GOG) 
Georgetown 12.06.12 
Pradeepa 
Bholanath 
Guyana Forestry Commission, 
Head-Planning & Development 
Division 
Georgetown 13.06.12 
James Singh Guyana Forestry Commission, 
Commissioner of Forests 
Georgetown 13.06.12 
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Major General 
Joseph Singh 
Chairman of the Board, Guyana 
Geology & mines commission, 
independent member of MSSC 
Georgetown 13.06.12 
Sophie Makannon Inter-American development 
Bank, Country Representative 
Georgetown 14.06.12 
Lawrence 
Anselmo 
AmerIndian Peoples Association Georgetown 14.06.12 
Patsy Ross United Nations Development 
Programme, Programme 
Analyst- Environment 
Georgetown 14.06.12 
Darshana Patel The World Bank Guyana Georgetown 15.06.12 
Colin Sparman Guyana Gold & Diamond 
Miners association 
Georgetown 18.06.12 
David Singh Executive director, Conservation 
International Guyana 
Georgetown 19.06.12 
Preeya 
Rampersaud 
Environmental policy 
coordinator, Conservation 
International Guyana 
Georgetown 19.06.12 
Gaulbert 
Sutherland 
Journalist, covering the Norway- 
Guyana partnership for Stabroek 
News 
Georgetown 19.06.12 
Nicola Jenns DFID, worked in Guyana for 4 
years 
Bridgetown 25.06.12 
Raymond Drouin Head Development Cooperation, 
Guyana and Suriname, Canadian 
High Commission 
Georgetown 
(phone 
interview 
from Oslo) 
06.07.12 
Tim Liang PhD on Guyana and REDD, 
London School of Economics 
Georgetown 
(phone 
interview) 
12.07.12  
Ann  Danaiya Journalist, Development Today Oslo 13.08.12 
Per Fredrik Pharo ME. Leader of NICFI Oslo 17.08.12 
Hans Brattskar ME Expedition leader 
Department of International 
Climate Cooperation 
Oslo 28.08.12 
Mads Halfdan Lie Forest and Climate Officer 
(REDD+) 
WWF Norway 
Oslo (phone 
interview) 
20.09.12 
Inge Nordang MFA, Latin America section Oslo 18.10.12 
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